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This thesis is concerned with the application of an inductive mode} 
to a situation of conflict and the purpose of this study is to test the 
hypothesis that an inductive game model can be applied descriptively to 
examine the Cuban missHe crisis. 
The game model as worked out provided a solution to the Cuban 
missile crisis that approximates the policies which the Soviet and 
American governments followed during October of 1962, and it also 
established that the Soviet and American governments acted rationr:i.lly i.n 
the Cuban crisis of 1962, given the alternatives available to each 
party. 
I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation 
for the assistance and guidance given me by the following members of my 
cornmitteg: Professor Raymond Habiby, who first nurtured my interest in 
International Relations, and who was always available for counsel and 
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The importance of game theory has for sometime been recognized in 
the field of international relations. However, game theory has made 
only minor contributions toward providing a general approach or frame-
work for studying the nature of conflict in the present international 
1 
system. William Welsh has stated that "despite the potentialities of 
the theory of games, there have been few attempts to use this approach 
analytically in the study of international conflict. 112 Traditional game 
theory is by nature rational and deductive. This has prompted foreign 
policy experts and political theorists to seek prescriptive applications 
from game models that would be of practical value for the decision-
makers in government. Yet the demands made upon game theory as an 
applied, prescriptive tool are particularly severe, for game theoreti-
cians are generally looking for the resolution of a broad class of 
problems rather than the optimum strategy for a particular conflict. 3 
It would appear that the self-imposed limitations encountered in using 
static game models are often outweighed by the ambiguities of dynamic 
1William Welsh, "A Game-Theoretic Conceptualization of thl;l Hungari-
an Revolt: Toward An Inductive Theory of Games," Connnunist Studies and 
the Social Sciences, ed. Fredric Fleron (qh~c_a_~?,,1, -~969)LJ>• 422. 
2Ibid., P• 420. 
3Anatol Rapoport, "The Uses and Misuses of Game Theory," Scientific 
American, CCVII, 6 (December, 1962), pp. 109-111. 
1 
world politics and may be incongruous with the mathematical solutions 
that traditional or zero-sum games proposes. Anatol Rapoport has 
suggested that ''if the insight-generating role of game theory is to be 
further developed, then the next step is toward a descriptive theory, 
4 
not a prescriptive theory." 
Most of the criticism mentioned are directed at traditional or 
zero-sum game theory, whereby the players are competing for an all or 
nothing gain pending a particular move, thereby comprising a "pure 
conflict" situation. 5 The rules governing the moves of the players are 
determined before the game begins and cannot be changed during the 
course of the game. Traditional games, then, are by nature static and 
deductive, becoming we~kest at their strongest point because the mathe~ 
2 
matical precision of the game is often undermined by the fluid character 
of most international disputes. Cooperativ~ or non zero-sum games, how-
ever, seem to allow some induction to occur in the course of the game 
because the players are competing for limited losses and gains. Also, 
cooperative or mixed-motive games are more dynamic in character, stem-
ming from the freedom of the players, in some game models, to choose 
. 6 
different moves during the course of play. Therefore, cooperative or 
mixed-motive games appear more conducive to inductive and descriptive 
analysis of international conflicts than traditional game theory. 
The major problem to which this study is directed is a game-
4 Anatol Rapoport, Two-Person Game Theory: The Essential Ideas 
(Ann Arbor, 1969), p. 203. 
5 Morton Kaplan, "A Note on Game Theory and Bargaining," New 
Approaches.!.!!:, International Relations, ed. Morton Kaplan (New y;;;k, 
1969), pp. 486-489. 
6Ibid., PP• 492-494. 
3 
theoretic conceptualization of the Cuban missile crisis through the 
insights that an inductive game model might provide. Basically an 
inductive model would empirically test selected gcime theory generaliza-
tions by examining spec.ific conflicts and then modify or corroborate 
these generalizations on the basis of observations, instead of deducing 
solutions to specific conflicts from broad game theory generalizations. 
The inductive model employed here will also attempt to correct some of 
the major flaws present in standard game theory analysis. For example, 
traditional game theory fails to deal with some of the basic moves that 
7 
occur in actual games of strategy. Concepts such as threat, enforce-
ment, capacity to connnunicate or destroy connnunication are not typically 
included in game theory analysis. An inductive model would include the 
aforementioned concepts pioneered by Schelling and others, along with 
the necessary modifications in the structure and rules of the game 
8 
necessitated by alteration of the fundamental nature of game play. Our 
model will be characterized as a finite, "two person," non zero-sum game 
between the Soviet Union and the United States and will deal with the 
relations between these goverrunents during the missile crisis. Specifi~ 
cally the study is designed to (1) outline the major limitations of game 
theory so that certain objections to traditional game theory can be 
avoided in constructing an inductive game model; (2) describe the 
salient events of the Cuban missile crisis in game-theoretic parlance, 
~- . ' ; 
so' tl:'iat the dimensions of the conflict can be clarified; (3) attempt to 
make "comparative rationality estimates" of the behavior of the two 
7 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, 1960), 
p. 84. 
8 
Welsh, p. 428. 
-4 
principal players during the crisis. 9 This involves asking which set of 
available courses of action seems most likely to have been optimum for 
the parties to the conflict, given the specified or assumed goals of the 
10 players. Also, the analysis will utilize concepts developed by 
Schelling, Boulding and Welsh and will avoid using traditional game 
theory concepts whenever possible. Naturally, such an approach carries 
the danger of the unadulterated use of complex theory; but this appears 
to be a necessary step if students of international relations are to 
derive an analytical framework from game theory. 11 Therefore, one of 
the main goals of this study is to conceptualize a specific interna-
tional conflict in game-theoretic terms for descriptive rather than 
prescriptive applications. It is hoped that such an undertaking will 
interject an inductive element into game theory that is presently 
lacking in most game theory research. 
The hypothesis of this study is that an inductive game model can be 
applied to study situations of conflict (in this case the Cuban missile 
crisis). ay conceptualizing the Cuban missile crisis in game-theoretic 
tenns, it should be possible to establish the significant alternatives 
which were available to the Untted States and the Soviet Union during 
this confrontation. In short, the moves considered in a u.s.s.R.-U.S.A. 
inductive game model should lay bare the parameters of Soviet and 
American decision-making as they functioned throughout the missile 
crisis. 
9Ibid., p. 420. 
lOibid., p. 421. 
11 Rapoport, Scientific American, pp. 109-111. 
5 
A statement about the proposed methodology to be employed in this 
study now seems to be in order. The game-theoretic analysis of American 
and Soviet relations during the Cuban missile crisis will involve first 
an indication of the limitations of game theory. Second, the salient 
events of the Cuban missile crisis will be described in game theory 
parlance. This will involve an elaboration of the rules, moves, goals 
and a payoff matrix to be considered in the game. Third, a comparison 
of game model predictions with the actual behavior of the players will 
be made. Finally, by attempting comparative rationality estimates of 
the players' behavior, it is hoped that the game model's appropriateness 
a~d validity might be tested. 
The main advantages of utilizing game theory to study the Cuban 
missile crisis are twofold: (1) concepts regarding the basic alterna"' 
tives that each government might have seriously considered can be 
quantitatively examined in the payoff matrix of the proposed game model, 
(2) direct access to detailed and secret government data is not abso-
lutely necessary to conceptualize the missile crisis, because game 
theory permits us to postulate the moves each government contemplated. 
Game theory analysis is an important approach to dissect the rationales 
underlying the decision-making process of a particular government in 
specific international conflicts which may appear to be incomprehensible 
to the average citizen. 
CHAPTER II 
THE NATURE AND LIMITATIONS OF GAME THEORY 
Game theory has developed mainly as a branch of mathematics 
concerned basically with the formal aspect of ratioµal decision. 1 
Martin Shubik defines game theory "as a mathematical method for the 
study of some aspects of conscious decision-making in situations 
involving the possibilities of conflict and or cooperation. 112 And that 
"the essence of the game is that it involves decision-makers with goals 
and objectives whose fates are intertwined. 113 Examples of games rele~ 
vant to political science are generals engaged in battles, diplomats 
involved in bargaining and negotiation, legislators trying to put 
together coalitions, etc. 
The theory of games focuses on "general principles governing the 
logical structure of conflict. 114 However, the main concern of game 
theory is~ the empirical study of how people make decisions (that 
includes the personality makeup and psychological motives of the 
players), rather, it is a deductive theory about the underlying condi~ 
tions that the players' decisions would have to meet in order to be 
1Martin Shubik, "The Uses of Game Theory," Contemporary Political 
Analysis, ed. James C. Charlesworth (New York, 1967), p. 240. 
2Ibid., p. 241. 
3Ibid., p. 240. 
4 
Rapoport, Two-Person Game Theory, p. 77. 
7 
considered. rational, consistent, or noncontradictory. 5 Thomas Schelling 
has labeled this kind of 4heory nol;'11lative or rational in scope when 
contrasted to p~edictive or explanatory theory in the social sciences. 6 
Morton Kaplan remarked recently that ''game theory is useful mainly as a 
source of insights that produce analogies applicable to the problems of 
international politics. 117 
Professor Morgenstern and von Neumann launched game theory as a. 
tool for studying economic behavior over two decades ago in their 
classic work,! Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. 8 Since then 
political theorists have extended Morgenstern and von Neumann's ideas to 
the problems of military and political strategy. The cold war and its 
bipolar nature made it possible to apply traditional two-person game 
theory to the military and political stalemates of the time. That is 
why prescriptive solutions were sought from game theory while the 
descriptive or explanatory potentials were ignored. 9 
Game theory has enjoyed limited success in areas related to mill-
tary and political strategy, but in situations of pure conflict it 
yielded important insights that helped define military deterrence 
10 
strategy. ~wo-person bargaining games without obvious solutions or 
"saddle points" also "made a genuine and original contribution in the 
5Thomas Schelling, "What is Game Theory," Contemporary Political 
Theory, ed. James C. Charlesworth (New York, 1967), p. 213. 
6. 
Ibid., P• 214. 
7 Kaplan, p. 486. 
8 
John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern,! Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1944). 
9 
Rapoport, T-wo-Person ~ Theory, p. 191. 
10 · 
Schelling,~ Strategy of Conflict, p. 207. 
8 
area of prescriptive theory. 1111 
Political decision-makers need to consider many alternatives in 
resolving specific problems, so that they need a theory that will come 
up with solutions that have managed to elude their notice. Yet, game 
theory has been unable to provide these unsuspected answers for practi~ 
tioners in the volatile world of international politics because the 
mathematical applications of game models are normally limited to situa-
. 12 
tions of pure conflict in which one party gains or loses everything. 
For these reasons the future of traditional game theory as a 
deductive tool of political analysis appears dim unless mathematicians 
and social scientists can extend the boundaries of the theory of games 
to include new concepts that are verifiable and applicable to dynamic 
game situations. Professor Kaplan echoes these sentiments in the 
following quote: "no existing formal models of game theory are directly 
applicable to the problems of international politics. 1113 Anatol 
Rapoport suggested a different avenue of approach for game theory that 
could continue to produce insights for studying military and political 
strategy when he advised social scientists and mathematicians to develop 
descriptive uses of game theory for explanatory rather than prescriptive 
14 purposes. In the research that follows, an attempt will be made to 
insert the parameter values observed in a real-world crisis into an 
inductive model of conflict and then the predictions of our game model 
11 484. Kaplan, P• 
12Ibid., P• 485 
13Ibid. 
14 
432. Welsh, P• 
will be compared to the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis, thus 
providing a basis for refining future descriptive models of interna~ 
tional conflict. 
9 
Before proceeding to employ game theory analytically, consideration 
of the limitations and difficulties encountered in applying game mod~ls 
is in order. To begin with there are differences between traditional-
game theory a la von Neumann and Morgenstern and the expanding theory of 
conflict proposed by Schelling and Boulding among others. 15 The analy-
sis that follows will focus on the major criticisms leveled at tradi= 
tional game theory, as well as the unresolved problems still encountered 
in spite of recent modifications of the theory. 
The major attack on the applications of game models is that game 
theory i:nvites its own abuse because uncritical use is so prevalent 
among unsophisticated social scientists. 16 William Welsh, who is aware 
of this, lists four reasons why game theory is particularly relevant 
despite criticisms to the contrary. Specifically, he says, the theory 
of games: (1) is relevant to situations of current political and mili~ 
tary interest, (2) promises "solutions" to prescriptive problems of 
strategy, (3) has the prestige of derivation from the theoretically 
well-developed field of mathematical economics, (4) is sufficiently 
complex in its unabridged form to lead to the adoption of its "essen~ 
tial" concepts and ideas in a "relaxed" mode. 17 However, this does not 
eliminate the pitfalls, for uncritical applications may do more harm 
15Ibid. 
16 Kaplan, System and Process (New York, 1957), p. 188. 
17 
Welsh, p. 424. 
10 
than good. 
Problems normally met in using game theory are grouped under three 
major headings, namely: conceptual, logical, and operational. Concep-
tual problems include "those having to do with the lack of clarity in, 
18 or the lack of elaboration or possible extension of, the theory." The 
major problems to contend with in assessing the conceptual limitations 
of game theory are: the rationality problem; limitations of scope; the 
static character of the "rules" of the game and the inadequate handling 
of cooperative or mixed-motive games. Logical problems "have to do with 
empirically relevant assumptions necessitated by the structure of the 
19 
theory." And operational problems are "those that deal more directly 
20 with fitting real-world data into the equations of the theory." Welsh 
notes that in a sense all these problems are operational in nature or at 
least operationally relevant when a game model is constructed. 21 
Conceptually game theory assumes "rational" behavior on the part of 
the players, but since human behavior is sometimes anything but rationalj 
critics argue that there is little to be gained from using a theory that 
makes such a claim. This attacks a fundamental problem of game theory, 
but does so inaccurately. Anthony Downs and Herbert Simon, to mention a 
few, have effectively used "rational" models of human behavior in 




Their models spotlighted ways in which 
21Ibid., p. 423. 
22 Anthony Downs,~ Economic Theory~ Democracy (New York, 1957); 
also, Herbert Simon, Models of~ Social and Rational (New York,.} 9 •. ~.D.: ..... 
11 
real-world situations differ from the theorist's model, thus allowing 
refinements to be made between the predictions of the model and reality. 
The real problem here stems from the way "rationality" is defined in 
traditional game theory, namely the lack of an exact definition and the 
inconsistency existing in the major works on the subject. Luce and 
Raiffa define rationality as "any assumption one makes about the players 
maximizing something, and any about complete knowledge on the part of 
h 1 . l . . ,,23 t e payer in a very comp ex situation. Naturally, such conceptual 
imprecision leaves something to be desired. Anatol Rapoport has 
suggested that rationality be classified according to the different 
levels present in the game and lists three levels of rationality possi= 
' 
ble in traditional game theory: (1) each player has a dominating 
strategy, (2) only one player has a dominating strategy and, (3) neither 
24 player has a dominating strategy. Unfortunately this does not; resolve 
the dilemma because, while zero-sum games normally have minimax and 
.maximin strategies that are identical and are labeled "saddle points" 
(an entry in the strategy matrix of a game which is at the same time the 
minimum in its row and the maximum in its column or the best of the 
25 
worst strategy), in non-zero sum games this is not the best strategy, 
for the maximin assures a player only a minimal guaranteed payoff or 
security level whereas the m,inimax strategy keeps the other player's 
26 payoff to his security level. Defining rationality in this situation 
23R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisionsg Intro-
duction~ Critical Survey (New York, 1957), p:-S. 
24 
Rapoport, Two-Person~ Theory, p. 55. 
25 Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience (New York, 1963), p. 312. 
26Ibid., p. 46. 
12 
becomes difficult, for how does one ascertain the optimum strategy for 
each player in the game? That is, why at present are there four 
conflicting solutions to rationality in non-zero sum games called 
Braithwaite's solution, Nash's solution, Shapley's solution and Raiffa's 
1 . ?27 so ut1.on. If an agreement can be reached on the question of ration-
ally solving negotiated games, progress might be achieved in the futur~. 
Another conceptual limitation concerns the boundaries of scope in 
game theory. One major limitation concerning the scope of game theory 
is its failure to identify the "perceptual and suggestive element in the 
formation of mutually consistent expectations. 1128 What this means is 
that the players' perceptions and motives are not allowed to modify the 
play once the game is started when in the real-world they are allowed to 
do so. Rapoport and others agree with Sch~lling's statement but a:J;."gue 
that this "requires data and methodological tools which fall wholly out-
29 side of game theory." It is true that the eventual separation of 
psychologica1 and logical considerations in game theory would expand the 
scope of game theory, but for now probably the ''most important achieve-
ment of game theory has been its ability to reveal its own limita~. 
. ,,30 ti.ans. 
A third conceptual limitation encountered in using the theory of 
games is the static character of the "rules" of the game. In tradition-
al game theory the rules of the game are specified before the game 
27Rapoport, Two-Person Game Theory, pp. 104~122. 
28schelling, ~ Strategy of Conflict, PP• 83-84. 
29 Rapoport, Two-Person~ Theory, p. 93. 
30 Rapoport, Scientific American, p. 114. 
13 
begins and cannot be altered during the course of the game. This is one 
of the severely limiting factors game theoreticians must contend with in 
applying game models to social conflict. This is often unreal, as a 
player may have the means physically or psychologically to change the 
rules of the game during the course of play 1 thus changing the payoff 
matrix for the players. Clearly there are important differences between 
"rationality" under static and dynamic conditions, so game theory needs 
to be modified to account for the possibility of having different rules 
31 for different game models. This criticism of traditional game theory 
has caused some theorists to seek an extension of the rules of the game 
to take into consideration the role of such situations as threats and 
. 32 commitments. 
Another area where game theory is conceptually weak is its inade= 
quate handling of cooperative or mixed=motive games. Thus, game theory 
is weakest precisely where it is most relevant. Traditional game models 
deal mainly with "pure conflict" situations and in precise ways, whereas 
non-zero stnn games still lack theoretical development or exact solutions 
to mixed-motive situations. Several aspects of cooperative games have 
been inadequately handled or ignored in traditional theory. For 
example, the possibility of coalition formation in n=person games are 
33 not considered in traditional game theory. Game theory also has been 
unable to predict "what kind of coalition will form 9 under what condi= 
tions the coalitions might form, nor how the rewards will be divided in 
31 Kaplan, System and Process, p. 1.72. 
32schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, p. 84. 
33welsh, p. 426. 
14 
a coalition. 1134 William Riker in his The Theory of Political Coalitions 
has offered a controversial yet challenging model that probes into this 
inflexible area of game theory, and one can now hope that future refine-
ments of traditional game principles will offer some promise in reasses-
sing the influence of coalitions. 35 
Another aspect of mixed-motive situations with which theoreticians 
have unsuccessfully dealt concerns the basic moves in actual games of 
36 strategy and the structural elements on which moves depend. Concepts 
such as threat, enforcement and the capacity to cormnunicate or destroy 
. t" t "d d · 1 37 cormnunica ion, are no consi ere in norma games. Professor 
Schelling has attempted the extension or more specifically the reorien-
tat ion of game theory along these lines. The major p~ob lem here is the 
game matrix. Once Schelling's modifications are added it can no longer 
adequately represent the game. The introduction of threats, corrnnit-
ments, alters the fundamental nature of game play to the extent that the 
game cannot be reduced to normal game form. Basically, this means the 
strategies available in the extended form of the game (a situation where 
the choices are known but all the possible strategies and outcomes have 
not been listed or normalized as yet) are affected by Schelling's alter-
ations. Professor Welsh tried to ameliorate this problem by devising a 
game matrix that represents discrete sequential moves. This means that 
the game model would not represent the normalized game form. Instead, 
34Ibid. 
35w·11· R"k Th Th f P 1· . 1 C 1· . (N H i iam i er,~ eory o o itica oa it1.ons ew aven, 
1962). 
36schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, p. 83. 
37Ibid., P• 84. 
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the matrix "would represent the outcomes of sequential moves~ each of 
38 
which could be reconsidered at each juncture of play." Thus, rithe 
matrix could be fully specified ahead of initial play, but would include 
b · f h "bl b r· · ,,39 su matrices or eac poss1 e su sequent con 1gurat1on. One obvious 
objection of this scheme is that such a game matrix would be enormous:i 
requiring linear programming techniques for its de.termination. Welsh 
attempts to resolve this roadblock by concentrating on those submatrices 
that seem to contain a "solution" in the game=theoretic sense. Rapoport 
seconds this reasoning by pointing out that the real importance of game 
theory lies not in its identification of possible outcomes and strate= 
gies, but rather in the conceptualization of games or the way by which 
game theorists limit the numerous strategies possible in a game. 4° For 
8 6 4 
example, the simple game of Tic=Tac-Toe has 9 x 7 x 5 x 3 or 
65,664,686,390,625 possible outcomes for the first player's strategies. 41 
But of this number, 126 outcomes are possible. when inflated values are 
eliminated and even less when equivalents are eliminated. Specificallyi, 
the simultaneous-choice section of the Cuban missile crisis model is 
even mo.re theoretically complicated~ coming out to [36 ! J divided by 
[6!], in other words, many trillions of possible outcomes! As Schelling 
rightfully concludes, "there is no exhaustive catalogue of even the 
simplest kinds of inte.rdependence that can exist between the decisions 
38welsh, p. 428. 
39rbid. 
40 
Rapoport, Two=Person Game~' p. 43. 
41 Ibid., pp. 42=43. 
J.6 
42 
of two people." In order to avoid such mind=bogging m.1.rnbers, my 
research will gratefully employ Welsh 1 s game=theoretic conceptualiza= 
tions regarding the use of discrete sequential. moves and the a priori 
examination of submatrices that might contain a "solution." More will 
be said about this later in the study. 
Another related problem with mixed=motive games is the difficulty 
of assessing precisely the impact of behavior and other forms of commun= 
43 ication, especially speech, on the payoff. According to Schelling the 
"tactical significance of moves (behavior) makes them qualitatively 
44 different from pure spe.ech. 11 The nature of game play and the payoff 
matrix are undeniably affected by behavior"' while this may not be the 
case in situations dealing with symbolic communicatio:n; so our problem 
is to ascertain the dynamic impact of moves and other fonns of comrnuni= 
cation on the payoff matrix. By following Welsh 1 s scheme we will 
suggest "that moves may alter the .e~·off ~td.x itself j while threats~ 
promises and commitments alter the perceptions of the matrix held by the 
45 
players." The difference between verbal statements and moves cannot 
be overstated. However 3 the effectiveness of threats depends a great 
deal on their credibility, whic.h is strongly influenced by the threaten= 
er' s past and present behavior. Prior threats may likewise. affect the 
player's evaluation of his opponent's projected move. Assigning payoffs 
for threats and moves is a highly subjective affair for they are 
42schelling, "What is Game. Theory," p. 220. 
43 Welsh, p. 428. 
44schelling, The Strategy of s:;onflic~, p. 99. 
45 
• Welsh, p. 428~ 
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. · 11 . d d 46 partia y inter epen ent. Although this is hardly reassuring in a 
methodological sense, such a step is necessary if the proposed game 
model is to include recent contributions in game theory. 
A final proposition apropos to the analysis of mixed-motive games 
concerns the tendency of game theoreticians to attribute empirical 
significance to mathematical solutions. Mixed-motive games often have 
solutions that depend on mutually perceived obvious conjoint strategies 
or those solutions with unique characteristics. These "focal points" 
depend on characteristics that differentiate them qualitatively from 
other available choices. 47 Thomas Schelling warns against accepting 
game characteristics that claim sophisticated mathematical solutions, 
for they might not have the power of focusing expectations that influ-
ence the outcome of the game. Also, mathematical game solutions may be 
based on maximizing a player's utilities which could be at odds with 
reality and politically disasterous if followed. 48 
The urgent need of game theory today is in the development of 
insights that will explain the mutual expectation process. This theo-
retical assistance has been beyond the scope of traditional game theory 
and probably will emerge from social psychology and other related social 
sciences. 
The second major problem area pertaining to the limitations of game 
theory deals with its logical limitations. The discussion of logical 
boundaries will encompass two aspects: (1) the exclusion of unforeseen 
46 
Welsh, P• 428. 
47Ibid. 
48schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, p. 113. 
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developments or events and, (2) ihe absence of an inductive component in 
the theory of games. 
The exclusion.of unforeseen events in game models means that the 
possibility of unanticipated developments affecting the nature of play 
is not considered in conflict situations. A postulate of game theory is 
that everything that could possibly occur in the progress of play must 
be known in advance of the start of play. This static assumption is 
·highly unrealistic but a necessary condition of traditional game theory. 
The game theorist, if he follows this reasoning, will be forced to 
exclude highly significant tactical principles from his game model. 
Sequential moves, likewise, have no effect on the play of the game, 
while in real-life situations they may be of great significance. This 
assumption is not as serious a drawback as might be expected. For the 
assumption that everything is known in advance does not necessarily mean 
49 that game theory forces an artificial inflexibility on the players. 
Indeed, a strategy in game-theoretic expressions is only "a set of 
directions which tells a player what he is to do in every possible 
situation in which he finds himself. 1150 
The strategy of this study will specify responses to prior set 
moves as well as to anticipated simultaneous moves by other players. B_y 
doing this we hope to ameliorate the problem with which game theory 
confronts us by not allowing the play of the game to modify the environ-
ment. The distance between the assumption of the model and reality does 
not seem so incongruous if anticipated moves are specified by projecting 
49 Welsh, p. 429. 
50 
Rapoport, Two-Person~ Theory, p. 40. 
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possible strategies at the beginning of the game. This is especially so 
if we assume "that real-world decisional units might have strategies in 
the game.theoretic sense, depending upon their intelligence apparatus 
and the imaginativeness of their decision-makers. 1151 
Another logical limitation of game theory concerns the lack of an 
inductive component in its development. The evolution of game theory 
has come about largely within mathematics,.which relies on entirely 
deductive models for explanation. Rapoport and others have argued that 
the lack of an inductive element in deductive game models has been 
particularly disabling. At the general level inductive logic is needed 
if game theory is to progress toward providing an empirical base for the 
study of conflict situations. 
It was mentioned earlier that game theory does not lack generaliza-
tions but, without verification of them in specific cases, much is left 
wanting. The process of modifying or corroborating generalizations on 
the basis of observation is the heart of the inductive process and is 
crucial for promoting inductive game models. More directly, "induction 
is necessary in the game-theory model to make the game-theoretic notion 
of "rationality" less restrictive. 1152 Next, induction is needed "to 
introduce a dynamic component into a heretofore essentially static 
53 model." Since the necessity of introducing a dynamic element into 
static gam~ .models was earlier discussed, some comment on the notion of 
rationality in inductive models now seems in order. The concept of 




"rationality" could be expanded to include an inductive trial and error 
method by which players could find their optimal strategies. 54 Rapoport 
reports that game theory which includes an inductive component could be 
extended t.o situations where the game matrix is not even known to the 
players. The ~layers could then discover trial and error optimal 
strategies, the results of their choices then being known to them, thus 
allowing them opportunities to modify their play several times during 
55 the game. Such a procedure is not considered in traditional games. 
This is ill-fated, for the process of making decisions that resolve 
international conflicts seems to have a strong, inductive trial and 
error features. 
The third major problem area of game theory is its operational 
limitation. Operational boundaries can be reduced to four categories: 
(1) the arbitrariness of values in the payoff matrix, (2) assumptions 
about motives, (3) single phy versus "supergame" orientations, (4) the 
overlapping of real-world games. 
The arbitrary values in the payoff matrix are the focal point 
around which a game reverts. A game matrix is normally represented by 
the numerical outcomes or utilities possible to the players in a game. 
Ev.en though the payoff matrix is of critical importance in the theory of 
games, there is no theoretical scheme available that assists in assign-
. · 1 · . 56 ing uti ities to outcomes. Critics naturally argue that game models 
can be of only minor empirical significance if the values in the payoff 
54 Rapoport, Two-Person Game Theory, p. 147. 
55Ibid. 
56 Welsh, p. 430. 
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matrix must always remain arbitrary. The accusation of arbitrariness is 
not as damning as it might first seem. One can argue that (1) all 
theories must begin with some "arbitrary" elements, (2) the "arbitrari-
ness" is as much a product of the inadequacies of our research methods 
in general as it is a product of the peculiar nature of game theory, and 
(3) the difference between the matrix values that could be obtained 
through ideal scaling techniques and those we can reasonably use in our 
study qf conflict situations are likely to be so slight as to have 
minimal effect on the interplay between theory and data. 57 
In response to item one, the arguement could be made that all 
theories have some necessary givens and the payoff matrix is a necessary 
given in game theory. Second, it is unfair to hold the game theorist 
liable for the apparent liabilities of the payoff matrix. The methodo-
logical improvements called for appear not to be within the scope of 
game theory, but outside of it, in social psychology. Continued improve-
ment is necessary in deriving values for the payoff matrix, especially 
in deriving the preference scales of the players, but there is little 
justification for completely discrediting game theory postulates because 
no methodology has yet been developed that will empirically deduce 
numerical values or the utility of these values in the payoff matrix. 
After all, no one tossed out the theorems of trigonometry because 
surveyors' instruments were not yet invented to take advantage of them. 
Similarly, the question could be asked, how much theory is verifiable in 
the study of international conflict to date? 
In spite of these justifications for using game theory, it must be 
admitted that there remains a great interest among game theorists as to 
57Ibid., PP• 430-431. 
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how values placed in the payoff matrix might be empirically derived. 
Typically, the only demand in game theory has been that the values in 
the matrix be measured on an interval scale. This means the players, at 
a mini~um, must have some idea of the ratio of differences among their 
58 
preferences. Similarly, decision-makers in the real-world must also 
assign utilities to outcomes, yet they seem to do no better than "on the 
,, 
spot estimates on.the basis of hunches. 1159 Social scientists conducting 
~ post facto examinations of crisis behavior of governments have been 
able to establish rank orderings of decisional preferences without 
direct access to the highest level of government. Unfo;tunately, only 
ordinal scales have been derived from such studies. The interval scale 
is one step higher in mathematical precision and scaling power than the 
ordinal scale. 60 Welsh suggests that interval scales can be derived 
from ordinal scales by analyzing past decision-making in conflict situa-
tions through systematic research that highlights the preferences and 
alternatives available to high policy-makers. 61 In doing so, the 
assignment of probabilities becomes crucial, especially in non-zero sum 
games where threats, conunitments, etc., are involved and outcomes are 
calculated simultaneously for an opponent's action. The derivation of 
58 Rapoport, Two-Person Game Theory, p. 28. 
59Ibid., P• 198. 
60cf. Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience, p. 311. "Ordinal scales 
are those that have a measurement procedure which allows only the deter-
mination of the rank of a set of objects but not.the distances between 
them, e.g. first choice, second choice, etc." "interval scales are 
those that have a measurement procedure which allows only the determina-
tion of the ratios of pairs between the magnitudes but not the ratios of 
the magnitudes themselves, e.g. the Centigrade scale, and the Fahrenheit 
scales." 
61 Welsh, p. 432. 
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preference scales from an empirical study of conflict situation should 
be restricted by only minor distortions. Distortions of great magnitude 
are usually possible when "there is a wide gulf between actual prefer-
ences on the one hand and behavior (including verbal descriptions of 
62 preferences) on the other." 
The assumption made about the players' motives comprise the second 
operational limitation of game theory. One perplexity associated with 
"the arbitrariness of the payoff matrix concerns the building into the 
matrix of assumptions about the players' motives. 1163 Utilities usually 
are translated into physical commodities, like money, prison tenns, 
economic or military resources, toward which the players' motives appear 
reasonably clear. But, the players' attitudes toward payoffs are not as 
lucid when payoffs represent success or failure in carrying out foreign 
policy goals. The search for optimum strategies then becomes directly 
related to the original purposes of the policy. Rapoport gives the 
example of disarmament inspection whose purposes depend on whether the 
goal of inspection is to prevent evasions or to discover them once they 
64 are comm:lted. Unfortunately, the "effort to take into account in the 
payoff matrix of motivational patterns is no more or less 'arbitrary' 
h h f . . "65 tan ot er aspects o matrix construction. Certainly, the theory of 
games cannot signify motivational analysis of the players' behavior any• 
more than it can tell us how to assign values for the payoffs. However, 
62Ibid. 
63Ibid. 
64 Rapoport, Two-Person~ Theory, p. 167. 
65 Welsh, p. 433. 
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game theory may dissect motives by linking them to distinctions among 
strategy preferences. 
Another major operational problem relates to the single play versus 
"supergame" orientations of game theory, An important relationship in 
game theory exists "between the number of times the game is played and 
the nature of strategic choices. 1166 Norma Uy, it is assumed that "mixed-
strategy" is compatible with situations of international conflict or, 
more precisely, that non-zero sum games without saddle points resemble 
international conflict. Yet, mixed-strategy solutions do not determine 
67 the outcome of any given play but only the long term average. However, 
in military and political spheres the parties can be limited to single 
play orientations. Considerable doubt exists as to whether a given 
conflict is actually a "game" in itself or one play in a "super-game" 
repeated over and over again in the international system. The descrip-
tive utility of game theory is not really affected by such considera-
tions, for they remain within the realm of prescriptive solutions. 68 
Furthermore, game theoreticians "could make mixed-strategy prescriptions 
probabilistically. 1169 Jn other words, if strategy~ were a player's 
optimum mixed-strategy four times and strategy!?, two times, then strategy 
~ would be selected in a single-play game. 
Our last operational limitation regards the overlapping of real-
world games in siiuations of conflict. The overlapping of real-world 
661bid. 
67 Rapoport, T.wo-Person Game Theory, p. 167. 
68 
Welsh, P• 433. 
691bid. 
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games is difficult to ascertain with any precision, although few would 
deny their impact on the conflicts in the international system. 
Certainly, the Hungarian revolt was related to the Suez crisis in a way 
that influen~ed available strategies, but how much is difficult to say. 
The Cuban missile crisis might have been aftected by the previous Berlin 
crises and the Bay of Pigs episode, but it is not clear how this would 
affect the nature of the game, for they occurred at an earlier time. 
Since no major international crisis, such as the Hungarian revolt or 
Suez crisis, was occurring at the time of the missile crisis, perhaps 
this operational limit~tion is not as serious as it might be in a 
conflict situation employing game-theoretic concepts. 
Having explained my game theory approach and the general limita-
tions that made the Welsh model the best to use in the Cuban missile 
crisis, the following chapter will undertake a historical-analytical 
study of the crisis. 
CHAPTER III 
THE SETTING OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 
The analysis that follows will attempt to employ a "relaxed" form 
of the theory of games that focuses on the descriptive or illustrative 
aspects of a situation of conflict. 1 Although systematic research has 
so far collected a huge amount of data on the missile crisis of a higher 
quality than most research projects concerned with conflict situations, 
probably very little would qualify as rigorous data-gathering. Many 
descriptive aGcounts of the major events and decisions of this conflict 
a,re used here. 
Before attempting to characterize the game model, a brief sketch of 
the missile crisis will be undertaken. No attempt is made to recon-
struct all the events of the Cuban missile crisis of October of 1962; 
rather, emphasis will be placed on those circumstances of major impor-
tance to our subsequent game-theoretic conceptµalization. Speculation 
about the motives behind the Soviet decision to place offensive weapons 
in Cuba and the American reaction terms of motivation are not consid-
ered, for this is normally beyond the scope of game theory. Instead, 
consideration is given to events occurring between October 14 - 28. 
· The Cuban missile crisis began on October 14, 1962, when an Air 
Force U-2 reconnaissance plane flying ov~r San Cristo'bal photographed 
1 Welsh, pp. 428, 438. 
?n 
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incontrovertible evidence that medium-range missile sites existed in 
2 
Cuba. Before this fly-over mission, there had been a growing contro-. 
versy in Washington between members of Congress and the Kennedy Adminis-
tration as to whether offensive weapons, especially missiles, were being 
placed in Cuba by the Soviets. Intelligence reports prior to October 
14, 1962 had concluded that no offensive weapons were present on that 
island, although there was a growing body of contradictory evidence that 
3 this might not be the case. President Kennedy, while campaigning 
before the Congressional elections of 1962, has staked the prestige of 
his administration on the claim that no offensive weapons were present 
in Cuba. 
The Soviet military buildup in Cuba began late in July, 1962, when 
large arms shipments began arriving there. All through August and into 
September the shipments continued unabated without any verifiable detec-
.tion by American intelligence sources that the cargoes might contain 
offensive weapons, particularly IRBM' s and MRBM' s. 4 Finally, a re con-
naissance flight approved by John Kennedy provided the evidence that set 
the crisis into motion. 
President Kennedy was actually informed of the photographic proof 
of offensive weapons on October 14, 1962. His first reaction was the 
summoning of selected high government officials to consider the matter. 
This group, later tabbed the Executive Committee of the National 
2 Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, (New York, 1969), p. 24. 
3 Roberta Wohlstetter, "Guba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and 
Foresight," Foreign Affairs, XLIII (July, 1965), P•. 692. 
4Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," 
American Political Science Review, LVXIII (September, 1969), p. 704 • ... ,. . ' . 
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Security Council, was to become the main decision-making body for advis~ 
ing the qhief executive on the alternatives available and their feasi-
bility for resolving the crisis. 5 The most crucial decision reached in 
the first meeting was that the response to the crisis should be timed 
with President Kennedy's public announcement of the situation. 6 Kennedy 
demanded utmost secrecy, realizing that this was essential if the United 
States was to grab the initiative in counteracting the strategic Soviet 
threat in Cuba. 
At the first meeting several modes of action were considered to 
force the Soviets into removing their missiles out of Castro's socialist 
encampment ninety miles from home. One alternative to respond to the 
dispute was inaction, but this was never a~~ choice. Yet, it 
was reportedly thrashed about by Secretary of Defense McNamara and 
others at the initial conference. 7 The crux of the argument for "doing 
nothing" was that "U.S. vulnerability to Soviet missiles was no new 
thing. 118 "Since the U.S. already lived under the gun of missiles based 
in Russia, a Soviet capability to strike from Cuba made little real 
difference. 119 This reasoning failed on two counts. First of all, the 
military capability of the Soviet Union would be increj:ised by one-half 
in terms of megatonnage deliverable while the warning time available to 
5 Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York, 1965), p. 675. 
6 Kennedy, p. 31. 
7 Robert Crane, "The Cuban Crisis: A Strategic Analysis of American 
and Soviet Policy," Orbis (Winter, 1963), p. 537. 
8Allison, p. 697. 
9Ibid. 
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American defenses would be reduced to five minutes. 10 American credi-
bility in Latin America and the rest of the world would, likewise, be in 
grave doubt if the Soviet Union's provocative act went unchallenged 
after President Kennedy's solemn warning to Russia not to place offen-
sive weapons in Cuba. 
Another possibility that was considered was the implementation of 
diplomatic pressures such as an appeal to the United Nations or the 
Organization of American States, or perhaps a summit conference. The 
removal of United States Jupiter missile bases in Turkey and Italy for 
the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba was another course of action 
suggested by the so called "United Nations" faction. 11 Khrushchev 
offered a similar proposal in the now famous second letter sent to John 
Kennedy on October 27, 1962, thus changing the whole nature of the 
crisis. Meanwhile, if diplomatic pressures became the main effort, what 
was to halt the Soviets from making their missiles in Cuba operational? 
After all, negotiations are notorious for the time necessary to reach 
I 
agreement, and the missiles were scheduled to be operational by December 
1, 1962. 12 A suggestion was proposed tbat a secret emissary approach 
13 Khrushchev and demand that all offensive weapons be removed. But this 
obviously would have given the Soviet Union the diplomatic initiative 
and might have led to an inflexible commitment by Khrushchev that would 
have increased the risk of a nuclear confrontation. Any strictly 
10 
Crane, P• 537 
lllbid, P• 53&. 
12E.W. Kenworthy, Anthony Lewis, and Max Frankel, "Cuban Crisis: A 
Step by Step Review," ~~York Times (November 3, 1962), p. 1. 
13Allison, p. 697. 
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diplomatic approach as a response to the crisis certainly appeared 
unrealistic to John Kennedy and the majority of the members on his ad 
hoc committee, since any concessions by the United States would have led 
to further demands by the Soviets. Similarly, the impact of American 
concessions would have obviously affected Europe, confirming the sus-
picions that the United States would sacrifice European interests when 
the going got tough. 14 
A third approach suggested in an article by Professor Allison was 
to send a secret mission to Castro offering him the choice of "split or 
fall. 1115 The fallacy of this plan was that Soviet personnel guarded, 
constructed, and transported their own weapons and equipment, thus, 
their removal would have to depend on a Soviet decision. Anyway, who 
could imagine Castro making a secret deal with the United States against 
the Soviet Union after the Bay of Pigs and recent American economic 
sanctions? 
A fourth plan of action seriously considered and then de-emphasized 
during the first meeting and in later sessions was the direct invasion 
of Communist Cuba to remove the offensive weapons. 16 Preparations for 
an invasion of Cuba would have led to the confrontation of 20,000 Soviet 
personnel and American troops. Such brinksmanship risked a nuclear 
exchange between the super powers and practically guaranteed a similar 
action in Berlin by the Soviets. 17 
14Ibid. 
15Ibid. 
16 Kenworthy, et.al., p. 1. 
17Allison, p. 697. 
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One of the two proposals singled out for serious consideration in 
this initial conference was a surgical air strike against the missile 
sites. The logic of this plan was that a surgical air strike (unan-
nounced) would eliminate the missile sites before they became operation-
1 18 a • This strategy would have, in addition, guaranteed the secrecy of 
the American inte~tions before the Russians found out that the United 
States was aware of the missile build-up in Cuba. The problem with this 
approach centered around the fact that the United States Air Force could 
not guarantee the destruction of all the missile sites without at least 
500 i h dl • 1 i "k I 19 sort es-- ar ya surgica a r stri e. A related problem raised 
by Attorney General Robert Kennedy was the moral issue: should the 
United States order a surprise attack after having lived through Pearl 
Harbor herself? Finally, an attack on Cuba would almost certainly kill 
Russian personnel, provoking a likely military retaliation by the 
Soviets against Berlin or Turkey. 
The final plan of action considered in the first meeting was some 
sort of blockade. This involved using indirect military action to 
pressure the Soviet missiles out of Cuba. Essentially, this proposal 
was to enforce an embargo on military shipments sailing to Cuba. As the 
week wore on the choice narrowed down to either a surgical air strike or 
a naval blockade, and in later meetings the blockade scheme gathered 
f bl h . . . 1 h S . · · 1 h 20 avora e support as t e initia response tote oviet missi et reat. 
The blockade proposal also had its attendent difficulties in that 
18 Kennedy, p. 37. 
191;bid. 
20 Arthur Schlesinger, ~ Thousand Days . (Boston, 1965), p. 804. 
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it increased the risk of a Soviet-American confrontation. For example, 
a blockade by the United States would invite a similar move by the 
Soviets in Berlin. This could only escalate the conflict and a likely 
joint solution then might be the dropping of both blockades, giving the 
Russians more bargaining time for making their missiles operational. 21 
A second complication was that if Soviet and foreign ships carrying 
suspected arms did not stop, the United States Navy might be obligated 
to fire the first shot, thus inviting retaliation by the Soviets. This 
became a real consideration as the crisis developed, because the possi-
bility of a military confrontation between the nuclear giants had 
become a reality on the high seas. Third, a blockade or the "quarantine" 
strategy presented the dilenuna that such a policy might be held to be 
illegal, even by the United States allies, who had always upheld the 
freedom of the seas. 22 A possible way out was a two-thirds favorable 
vote in the Organization of American States to circumvent any alleged 
violations of the United Nations Charter and international law, thus 
giving legal justification for the proposed American blockade. The 
biggest flaw in this proposed policy was the nagging thought in the 
minds of the strategists that this plan might not affect the status of 
the missiles in Cuba that were fast becoming operational. 
The blockade alternative had several comparative advantages in 
spite of its apparent liabilities. Graham Allison lists four bene£its: 
(1) It was a middle course between inaction and attack, 
agressive enough to communicate firmness of intention, but 
nevertheless not so precipitous as a strike. (2) It placed 
on· Khrushchev .. the burden of choice concerning the next step. 
21Allison, p. 698. 
22 Kenworthy, et.al., p. 2. 
He could avoid a direct military clash by keeping his ships 
away. His was the last clear chance. (3) No possible mili-
tary confrontation could be more acceptable to the U.S. than 
a naval engagement in the Caribbean. (4) This move permitted 
the U.S., by flexing its conventional muscle, to exploit the 
threat of subsequent non-nuclear steps i~3each of which the 
U.S. would have significant superiority. 
33 
On the evening of October 22, 1962, President Kennedy addressed the 
nation and the world in his now famous "Quarantine" speech. It became 
apparent from this speech that the blockade alternative had become the 
dominant policy of the United States Govermnent, coupled with strong 
threats for responding to the missile build-up. The United States Navy 
was to begin interdicting offensive weapons heading for Cuba on October 
24, 1962. 
In his address, John Kennedy stated that "to halt this offensive 
build-up, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under 
shipment to Cuba is being initiated. 1124 Continuing later in the speech, 
President Kennedy warned: 
It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear · 
missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western 
Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United 
St~tes15requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet 
Union. 
Kennedy, then, addressing Chairman Khrushchev said: "I call upon 
Chail;"man I<hrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, 
and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between 
our two nations. 1126 Kennedy further warned, "That is why this latest 
23Allison, p. 698. 
24 U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, Volume XLVII, No. 1220 
(November 12, 1962), p. 718. 
25Ibid., p. 719. 
26Ibid., P• 718. 
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Soviet threat--or any other threat which is made either independently or 
in response to our actions this week--must and will be met with deter-
. . .. 21 m1nat1on. 
The Soviet Union responded to Kennedy's address and the impending 
naval blockade by charging that such actions constituted a flagrant 
violation of international law. They likewise claimed that the Soviet 
weapons in Cuba were for defensive purposes to protect Castro's regime 
against any possible American invasion, and that provocative acts might 
lead to thermonuclear war. 28 Khrushchev's goverrnnent called for the 
convening of the United Nations Security Council to examine the question 
of violations of the United Nations Charter by the United States and the 
threat to the peace that those actions constituted. However, aside from 
alerting all Soviet troops and Warsaw Pact forces, no retaliatory mili-
tary action was taken. The immediate reaction centered around diplo-
matic initiatives both in the United Nations and later with the United 
States via diplomatic notes between the heads of state. Later in the 
week, however, previous threats of nuclear retaliation, if the United 
States invaded Cuba,.were repeated by Soviet military and goverrnnent 
ff . . l 29 o 1c1a s. Overall, the experts in Washington interpreted Soviet 
reactions to the initial American response as having been caught "off 
30 guard and were playing for time to think over the next m9ve. 11 
Events from October 22 through October 28 tested the wisdom of John 
27Ibid. 
28Nikita Khrushchev, "Khrushchev Remembers," Life (New York, 
December 1~, 1970), p. 47. 
29 Crane, pp. 546-547. 
30 Kenworthy, et.al., p. 6. 
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Kennedy's blockade strategy and produced a variety of responses by the 
Soviet Union ending in a settlement to the crisis. On October 24, 1962, 
the interdiction of ships suspected of carrying offensive weapons to 
Cuba began. There is a great deal of controversial testimony as to what 
exactly happened when the United States Navy intercepted Soviet ships 
31 
heading for Havana. One thing seems certain, that without the inter-
cession of Acting Secretary General U Thant, disaster may have occurred 
in the Caribbean. It is probably safe to say that Soviet and other 
foreign vessels passed through the "quarantine" after only onside 
inspection by the Navy, except for the boarding of the Soviet chartered 
ship Marucla. 32 Whether or not the naval blockade was rigorously upheld 
is difficult to assess with any certainty. The real importance of the 
American blockade was that it gave credibility to the Kennedy Adminis-
tration's threats to escalate the blockade and, if necessary, to inter-
vene militarily to remove the offensive weapons in Cuba. Likewise, this 
strategy allowed Khrushchev time to plan his moves without a naval 
incident blotching his response. 
The following is a brief recapitulation of the important events 
leading up to Khrushchev's decision to remove the missiles under United 
Nations supervision in return for the promise that the United States 
would not invade Castro's Cuba and end her naval blockade. 
On Wednesday, October 24, 1962, the day the interdiction of 
31 See Khrushchev, "Khrushchev Remembers," pp. 47-49; also U.S. 
Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparation Investigation 
Subcommittee, Interim Report~ Cuban Military Buildup, 88th Congress, 
1st Session, 1963, pp. 1-17; also U.S. Congress, H.O.R., Committee on 
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, 
Hearings, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, pp. 25-28. 
32 Kennedy, p. 82. 
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offensive arms was to get under way, eighteen Soviet dry cargo ships 
approaching the interdiction zone on their way to Cuba stopped dead in 
33 the water. Secretary of State Rusk was reported to have said at this 
time that, ''We are eyeball to eyeball and I think the other fellow just 
blinked. 1134 Later that day, American officials reported that fourteen 
ships had headed back for Soviet Union while six oil tankers proceeded 
toward Havana. The oil tanker Bucharest was permitted to proceed after 
the United States Navy was satisfied that it carried only petroleum. 
This represented a less severe policy stance than earlier statements had 
indicated. 
Meanwhile, the crisis had reached alarming proportions among the 
statesmen and masses of the world. Bertland Russell, noted British 
philosopher and pacifist, made an emotional appeal to Khrushchev and 
Kennedy to act rationally in this escalating crisis before the super 
powers blundered accidently into thermonuclear war. 35 Of more signifi-
cance, Secretary General U Thant called on the Soviet and American 
governments to suspend action for two or three weeks in order to cool 
off the conflict. His proposal called for the United States to end her 
quarantine temporarily in return for the Soviet Union's pledge that 
missile shipments to Cuba be suspended. 36 Khrushchev responded posi-
tively to the Secretary General's proposal and further called for a 
suxnmit conference. President Kennedy, on the other hand, although 
. 33Ibid. 
34Elie Abel,!.!!!:, Missile Crisis, (New York, 1964), p. 153. 
35 Kennedy, p. 74. 
36 U.N., Press Release, SG/1353, October 24, 1962, p. 2. 
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agreeing with U Thant's initiative for starting discussions to peace-
fully resolve the crisis, stood firm on his position that Soviet 
37 
missiles had to be removed before the blockade would end. The Soviets 
wanted very much to involve the United Nations in resolving the crisis, 
at least temporarily, but Kennedy was having none of that. Also, on 
that day the O.A.S. offered to help in the blockade of arms shipments to 
Cuba, after having unanimously backed the United State's blockade action 
the day before. 
In the Secur~ty Council the representatives traded recriminating 
statements capped off by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson's classic retort to 
Ambassador Zorin the next day that, "I am prepared to wait until hell 
f ].• f h I d • • 1138 reezes over, tats your ecision. This outburst was in response 
to a question Stevenson put to Zorin over whether or not Soviet missiles 
were in place in Cuba. All the while aerial reconnaissance revealed 
that work on the missile sites was going full blast. 39 In early 
exchanges of notes Kennedy and Khrushchev had threatened each other in 
no uncertain terms. Khrushchev claimed that he did not recognize the 
legality of the American blockade and would not order his ship captains 
40 to.halt if flagged down by the U.S. Navy. Yet, the events of October 
24 revealed that both sides were actually prepared to back off from 
their stated inflexible positions which, if followed, could have led to 
a confrontation on the high seas. 
37 U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, p. 740. 
38 Kennedy, p. 76. 




Thursday, October 25, provided signs that the conflict might be 
resolved without resort to violence. Khrushchev, in a yet unpublished 
letter sent to President Kennedy, was reported to have offered to remove 
the weapons under U.N. inspection for the American commitment that she 
would not invade Castro's Cuba in the future and with the understanding 
41 that the naval blockade would be ended. Also, Chairman Khrushchev 
sent a letter to U Thant that day indicating that he would keep his 
ships away from the blockade area temporarily. 42 Similarly, John 
Kennedy agreed with U Thant's suggestion that immediate arrangements be 
made for negotiations on the crisis, but he remained adamantly opposed 
to the cessation of the American blockade until all missiles were out of 
Cuba. 
Arnold Horelick, in evaluating Soviet responses during the crisis 
week, lists six reasons why the Soviets were prepared to change course 
precipitately and offer to withdraw their missiles: (1) The Soviet 
government had not secretly finished the missile buildup, and therefore 
could not present the U.S. wi~h a~ accompli in Cuba; (2) The United 
States, by preserving secrecy of her response, presented the Soviet 
Union with a fait accompli: the quarantine; (3) The swiftness of 
American action dumbfounded the Soviets and left the option of violence 
up to them in responding to the blockade; (4) The prompt and unanimous 
support of th(;! O.A.S. left little room for "waiting strategy" in diplo-
matic circles and made this alternative unfavorable to the Americans; 
(5) President Kennedy's decision to confront the Soviet Union directly 
41Ibid., P• 80. 
42 U.N., Press Release, SG/1357, October 26, 1962, p. 3. 
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and to ignore Castro also compelled the Soviet leade~s to detennine 
their course of action quickly; finally, (6) There was a speed and 
evident resolution with which the U.S. Government acted. This refers 
not only to the prompt and successful implementation of the quarantine 
and the rapid securing of O.A.S. cooperation and NATO support, but, 
above all, the impressiveness of U.S. conventional military build-up in 
43 
the southeastern states and the alert measures taken around the world. 
The next day, October 27, 1962, the crisis heated up all over again 
when Khrushchev in a second lett~r to President Kennedy proposed that 
44 missile bases in Cuba be swapped for American missile bases in Turkey. 
American policy-makers decided to ignore this letter and respond to the 
more satisfactory appeal made by Khrushchev the day before. President 
45 Kennedy indicated that the base swap deal was not acceptable. He 
reportedly took his younger brother's advice and ignored the new tougher 
Soviet response, and so notified Khrushchev that the proposals in his 
letter of October 26 were acceptable as a basis of understanding for 
settling the crisis. That day a U-2 plane was lost over Cuba, shot down 
by a Soviet SAM missile. An atmosphere of severe crisis hung over 
Washington. 
Premier Khrushchev set the world to breathing again in a message 
delivered over Radio Moscow on October 28, 1962. In this message he 
agreed to remove the weapons under U.N. inspection for the guarantee 
43Arnold Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of 
Soviet Calculations and Behavior," World Politics, XVI (April, 1964), 
P• 383. 
44 Kennedy, p. 89. 
45White House Press Release, October 27, 1962, p. 1. 
that the u.s. naval quarantine be ended and the promise that the U.S. 
would not invade Cuba. 46 President Kennedy immediately responded to 
Khrushchev's broadcasted letter. He agreed with Khrushchev's proposal 
and complimented him on his statesmanlike act. which allowed the crisis 
to be resolved. Khrushchev, in a statement released on December 12, 
1962, confided that at the time he made his speech he had been advised 
that a U.S. attack on the missile sites was imminent, and in order to 
47 limit his losses he had to move fast. The risks of leaving missiles 
in Cuba outweighed the possible gains. Walter Lippmann, in commenting 
on the Soviet move concluded, "The Soviet Union yielded because its 
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leaders found it highly credible that the United States would assume 
this incalcuiable risk. 1148 He meant by this that the United States was 
prepared to invade Cuba and assume the incalculable risk of nuclear war, 
and evidently Khrushchev agreed with Lippmann. This sort of conjecture 
is really beyond the framework of game theory, which does not consider 
the motives of the players. 
Although the crisis lingered on and the basic proposals were not 
carried out t9 the letter, for all practical purposes the crisis peaked 
and subsided on October 28, 1962. The American demand that the U.N. 
supervise the removal of Russian missiles was not met, but the U.S. 
satisfied this demand through aerial reconnaissance and onside board 
inspection. The naval blockade ended on November 21, 1962 and, except 
for the issue of removing the Soviet IL-28 bombers, the crisis was over. 
46 U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, p. 715. 
47Horelick, pp. 387-389. 
48 ' 
Wl;llter Lippmann, "Cuba and the Nuclea:i:- Risk," The Atlantic, CCXI 
(February, 1963), p. 56. 
CMPIBR~ 
A GAME-THEORETIC CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE 
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 
It is an arbitrary process to view the Cuban missile crisis as a 
conflict situation involving mainly the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Other perspectives are certainly possible. For example, the 
missile crisis could be viewed as an-person game matching the Western 
coalition versus the Communist coalition. 
Having decided on this move, the focus of the remainder of the 
paper will dwell on two sets of questions following Professor Welsh's 
suggestions: (1) Is game .theory helpful in conceptualizing this con-
flict? What are the major problems attendant to its use in connection 
with this particular case and what modifications to traditional game 
theory seem most appropriate? (2) Is it meaningful to use game theory 
predictively (as opposed to prescriptively) in making "comparative 
rationality estimates" of the behavior of the players and what dimen-
sions of the conflict under study, if any, are thereby highlighted? 1 
The Cuban missile crisis will be characterized as a finite, two-
person non-zero sum (negative sum) game. Basically, such a game is of 
the mixed-motive or bargaining variety suggested by Schelling's classi-
fication. A game of this kind is negative-sum in that there is no 
1 Welsh, p. 438. 
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position in which the players would be better off than if they did not 
play the game. This is not the same as saying that there is no qppor-
tunity for the players to make gains for there are considerable gains 
at stake. 
The "Cuban missile" game also is viewed as a game without perfect 
information. Generally, this is the case with decision-makers in 
goverrunent who must act on the basis of incomplete information. In game 
theory the condition of "perfect information" exists when each player 
knows exactly the position the other player has reached in the game. 2 
In other words, the player knows exactly what he and his opponent have 
done up to that point. What is more, the conception of information is 
past-orientated in game theory. Future information variables are 
handled as factors influencing the degree of certainty, risk, or uncer-
tainty, which typically characterizes the decision-making process in 
international affairs. This essentially means that future information 
variables in game-theoretic analysis are calculated in terms of risk and 
3 uncertainty. Unfortunately, most game theory models are not equipped 
to handle future possibilities, for they normally are past-orientated. 
In a game-theoreti~ sense it is far from obvious that the Cuban 
miss:i,le game is not one of perfect information. The Soviet Union and 
the United States both were informed in some cases of the other's 
planned moves. For instance, the Kennedy Administration informed the 
Soviet Goverrunent of its proposed blockade action. Also, both govern-
ments informed each other of what _contingencies they could expect if 
2 Rapoport, 
3 Welsh, p. 
' 




certain moves were executed. One example o~ this was the Soviet warning 
to the United States that if they invaded Cuba the Soviets would retali-
ate with a nuclear strike. Yet many other conceptual problems remain. 
For example, it would appear that the level of American information 
about Soviet moves in the crisis area was higher dur~ng portions of the 
crisis than was the corresponding level of Soviet information about 
American moves. This is easily explained by referring to the American 
geographic proximity to the "arena of play" in the Cuban game. The 
buildup of American forces in the southeastern United States was gener-
ally known, but the info;rmation the Soviets had might not have been 
specific enough for the Soviets to plan counter-measures in the Carib-
bean area. Similarly, neither nation was aware of how the other would 
respond in the interdiction zone when the American Navy met Soviet 
ships, and Khrushchev's final concession or move was based on question-
able information that U.S. military intervention was imminent in Cuba. 4 
The players involved in the Cuban game thus periodically had information 
that might have approximated the condition of "perfect information," but 
the uncertainty of whether or not the players would initiate unexpected 
moves (such as surgical air strike or invasion by the U.S.) contributed 
to the situation of imperfect information. 
The fact that the game is handled as one of perfect information is 
highly consequential analytically. 5 All games of perfect infdrmation 
have saddle points, whereas games without perfect information normally 
lack saddle points or equilibrium solutions. Likewise, games with 
4 Horelick, p. 387. 
5 Welsh, p. 440. 
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perfect information have pure strategies, whereas games without perfect 
information usually have mixed strategies that are considered optimum. 
that is why a player without perfect information is faced with a situa-
tion whereby he cannot choose strategies rationally because his moves 
6 are dependent upon the known choices of other players. How can a 
player respond to moves he knows nothing about? Decision-makers in the 
real world overcome this conceptual limitation of game theory by treat-
ing all conflict situations as if they were characterized by situations 
of perfect information, so conditional strategies are developed for 
responding to the moves of the other actors. The game theorist examin-
ing a conflict situation~ post facto may conclude that the decision-
makers lacked perfect information, but this is really a moot point, -for 
the actors normally act as if perfect information were available. By 
making the distinction between the behavior of the actors and the 
environment, the work load within this problem is somewhat alleviated. 
There is still one other connection worth noting between the infor-
mation content of the game and the existence of saddle points in a game; 
"there is no advantage in denying one's opponent information about one's 
moves, either intended or executed. 117 This is an important point for 
students of international conflict. For if we were to conceptualize the 
Cuban game as having perfect information, the game model "would predict 
that rational players would be quite open in their moves, to the point 
of making certain that all planned and executed moves were fully known 
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8 to the other players." Since this behavior was not seemingly present 
in the Cuban game, we must conclude that either the players were not 
acting rationally, or that the game did not have perfect information. 
Game theory qandles the conventional notions of information in a 
certainty-risk-uncertainty classification. These notions are defined 
as follows: (1) Decisions occur under conditions of certainty if each 
possible alternative move is known to lead invariably to a specific 
outcome. (2) Risk exists if each alternative action yields one in a 
set of possible outcomes, each outcome occurring with a known probabil-
ity. (3) The decision realm is uncertainty if any alternative has a 
set of possible specific outcomes, but the probabilities of these out-
comes are completely unknown or are not even meaningful. 9 
Ordinarily, we assume that real world decision~making occurs under 
a combination of risk and uncertainty. However, game theory normally 
treats all decisions as if they were made up of inltivid'ual deci,sions 
taken under the condition of risk. Althpugh this perspective is over-
simplified, it is necessary, for game theory requires that probabilities 
be associated with all possible outcomes. Thus, a payoff matrix cannot 
be developed without a "specification of the perceived probabilities 
that each outcome will occur, since the utility of a given alternative 
depends not only on the desirability of its possible outcomes, but also 
10 on the occurrence of each." · The payoff matri~ for the Cuban game will 





important moves of the players, namely, for the moves of the players 
working under threat of risk. 
Lastly, the Cuban game will be characterized as negotiable as 
opposed to non-negotiable. Negotiable games exist when the players have 
some element of connnon interest which can be utilized as leverage in the 
settlement of their conflicting interests. Such games come under the 
classification of mixed-motive or bargaining games, according to Schel-
ling's terminology. The common interest in these games is represented 
by the urge to avoid a mutually disastrous outcome. In the Cuban game 
this would be the desire of both players to avoid a nuclear confronta-
tion. Since the majority of big power confrontations on the interna-
tional scene present the prospect of mutually disastrous results 
periodically, the actors normally attempt to concert their actions 
through explicit or implicit means. 
The Cuban game will be basically concerned with an explicit 
bargaining game encompassing threats. Two other bargaining models will 
be presented briefly for illustrative and analogous reasons~ The first 
is the explicit bargaining model which exists when cooperative behavior 
between two or more players is characterized by the communication of 
h . ,l • 11 treats, promises, an~ commitments. Explicit bargaining models are 
normally considered to be negotiable games. The Cuban game will deal 
with an explicit bargaining situation whereby communicated threats 
accompany the moves of the players, Also, the focal points or prominent 
strategies of the players in the explicit bargaining situation will be 
examined along with their counterparts in the other two games. The 
11schelling, ~ Strategy £f Conflict, p. 67. 
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second game model will be concerned with a situation involving tacit 
cooperation or bargaining. Tacit cooperation involves players in a 
situation where no communication of threats, promises, or commitments is 
allowed in reaching a solution to a problem. 12 Since players often 
arrive at the same outcome without communication as they do with it, it 
should be interesting to compare the equilibrium points present in both 
games. Naturally, tacit bargaining games are non-negotiable, as opposed 
to explicit bargaining games which are considered negotiable. 
The other model will be characterized as an explicit bargaining 
game concerned exclusively with promises. This game model is basically 
an off-shoot of the first game and it will examine the possibility of 
promises providing an agreed upon solution to the Cuban crisis. It will 
be represented in a somewhat simpler payoff matrix than the explicit 
bargaining game involving threats, because the possibility of promises 
providing a solution to the crisis seems to be limited to relatively few 
moves. 
Another area of the game-theoretic conceptualization that needs 
clarification concerns the decision units or players in the Cuban game. 
We are concerned with nation states as actors in the international 
system and the players in the game are the Soviet Union and the United 
States. Yet, any party that makes choices and receives payoffs could be 
considered a potential player in the game. Also, attempts by the Soviet 
Union to involve the United Nations in its basic strategy could have 
altered the basic nature of the game. However, game theory does not 
permit alteration of the basic structure of play once it begins and this 
12Ibid., pp. 58-67. 
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is another reason for advancing an inductive component into game theory. 
Finally, it must not be forgotten that the problem is further compounded 
by the contagiousness of conflict, which may be the central fact of 
political life. 13 
The arena of play is another concept that needs explanation in this 
analysis because it is an important part of the game conceptualization. 
For our purposes, the borders of Cuba plus the interdiction zone in the 
Caribbean bound the arena of play. Where the exact moves occurred in 
the arena of play is not of much value. It is important, however, in 
helping to define the nature of the relationship between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Since traditional game theory is of little 
help here, the analysis will take advantage of Boulding's useful modifi-
cations. Kenneth Boulding advanced four important concepts concerning 
the arena of play in his classic work Conflict and Defense. 
The first concept is viability. This refers to the ability and 
willingness of one party to a conflict to destroy or eliminate another 
14 
party. A player that cannot be destroyed or absorbed as an inde-
pendent source of decision is said to unconditionally viable. 15 A party 
that can be destroyed or absorbed by another is conditionally viable, 
that is if the party that has the power refrains from doing so. A 
situation in which it does not pay for a party to extinguish another 
may be referred to as a secure or mutually conditional viability. 
Parties having secure conditional viability are faced with the problem 
13 Welsh., p. 443. 
14Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory 
(New York, 1963), pp. 58-59. 
15Ibid., P• 58. 
of how to control the conflict process. 16 This last form of viability 
appears to be an accurate characterization of the relationship between 
the Soviet Union and the United States in 1962. 
In discussing the concept of viability, we are suggesting that it 
is related to the location of the arena of play. 17 Hopefully, the 
connection between them will become clear after examining Boulding's 
second modifying concept, the loss-of-strength gradient or LSG. By 
examining the home base of two hypothetical nations 'located at! and B 
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in Figure 1, we can mea~ure a variable called "national strength" with 
the assumption that the national strength is maximum at its home base. 18 
H K 
L 
A D B 
Figure 1. Loss of Strength Gradient (LSG) 19 
16Ibid., P• 59. 
17 Welsh, p. 443. 
18Boulding, p. ,230. 
19tbid. 
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A nation's strength is measured by line AH for state A, and BK for state - - -
B. Continuing, the assumption is made that each nation's strength 
declines as it moves away from its home base. Following the slope of 
the lines!!§.. and HL for state!, and the lines~ and~ for state~, 
the LSG's for the respective states are identified. 
Boulding's third modifying concept is labeled the sphere£!. influ-
or where the LSG's intersect. 20 Figure 1 shows a boundary of 
equal strength at Q, where the strength lines intersect at~· To the 
right of line DE, state~ is stronger or dominant; to the left of DE 
state! is stronger. It follows that the area where each nation is 
dominant is its sphere of influence. Professor Boulding's analysis 
suggests that it is generally to the advantage of a nation to extend its 
sphere of influence except: (1) beyond a point where it encounters 
diminishing returns of scale, i.e., a decrease in its home strength with 
each successive increase in the sphere of influence; or (2) when parti-
cular characteristics of an area over which influence might be extended 
would serve to weaken the dominant nation, regardless of the distance 
between the area in question and the home base of the dominant state. 21 
An example of the latter might be the United States' involvement in 
Vietnam, where disproportionate amounts of men and equipment are extend-
ed by a dominant state to attempt to overcome a weaker North Vietnam. 
Cuba clearly is within the American sphere of influence. In Figure 
1, if the United States were state I, Cuba would be somewhere between 
point D and point I• It is also obvious that the continued inclusion of 
ZOibid. 
21 Welsh, p. 444. 
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Cuba within the American sphere of influence in 1962 would tend to 
increase the American LSG, but not to any great degree. Yet, since the 
variable of the characteristics of an area is independent of the vari-
able of diminishing returns to scale, whether or not a nation includes 
an area in its sphere of influence, X miles from the home base, depends 
on whether or not it is advantageous. Thus, an area X miles from the 
home base may be disadvantageous to include in one's potential sphere of 
influence. In the Cuban missile game, the principle of diminishing 
returns would have argued against any effort by the Soviet Union to 
encompass Cuba further in its sphere of influence. What is argued here 
is that the Soviets should not have tried to increase their sphere of 
influence so far away from the home base at the risk of a military 
confrontation with the United States. So, in attempting to keep her 
missiles in Cuba, which would eventually have made her reinforce the 
Soviet personnel there, the Soviet Union would be at a decided disad-
vantage, since the Soviet Union's home base was 11,000 kilometers away. 
For the United States, the events of the Cuban missile crisis suggest a 
sizeable increase in the American LSG. This should counsel the 
Americans against trying to maintain a decisive influence in Cuba, even 
if a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union could be avoided during 
an American invasion of Cuba. The harm such a policy would do to 
American foreign policy in Latin America probably would not be worth the 
risks of J;"emoving the missiles and Castro's government by military 
intervention. Also, such a policy would deploy American troops in an 
area when they might be needed for an emergency somewhere else in the 
world. 
The sphere of influence concept itself does not adequately portray 
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the American posture during the Cuban missile crisis. The analysis must 
be broadened by adopting Boulding's fourth concept of critical bounda-
22 '!:i.· Obvi.ously, the legal boundary of a nation is not always its most 
significant in influencing its behavior in the international system. 
Boulding argues that "most nations have a series of shells of boundaries 
f . d f . 1123 o varying egrees o importance. He further suggests "the outer 
shell may be a vague sphere of influence, violation of which elicits 
24 only diplomatic protests." Finally, Boulding states, "boundq.ries of 
increasing importance are found as one moves successively closer to a 
nation's home base, until one encounters the final critical boundary, 
which cannot be violated without war. 1125 It is probably safe to say 
that Cuba lay outside the critical boundary of the Soviet Union in 1962. 
What is more important for our analysis is whether Cuba lay within the 
critical boundary of the United States, especially as a strategic base 
for the Soviet Union. If Cuba was so perceived by American decision-
makers, the fact that the removal of missiles in Cuba would have 
increased the potential American LSG would have been of secondary 
importance. 
A game is complete when the players, strategies, moves,payoffs, and 
rules are specified. 26 The rules of a game normally specify the things 
a player may or may not do before attempting a move. Martin Shubik 




26 Kaplan, "A Note On Game Theory," p. 486. 
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further defines the rules of a game as "a specification of the dist.ribu-
tion of resources and the strategic possibilities open to each partici-
27 pant." Also, "included by implication in the rules are each partici-
pant's prospects (a subjective probability distribution of results) and 
payoffs (rewards for achieving given prospects). 1128 Strategy possibili-
ties, including prospects and payoffs will be treated in the next 
chapter, which deals with the payoff matrix. 
Certain crucial behavioral implications concerning the distribution 
of resources make it easier to identify our game model and make its 
application more meaningful. In the Cuban game, there are three such 
major rules or limitations: 
1. The United States and the Soviet Union possess the conven-
tional and nuclear military strength to inflict intolerable 
physical destruction upon each other, regardless of which 
nation might strike first. 
2. The Castro regime is not able to offer sustained, successful 
resistance to military intervention by the United States to 
destroy the Russian missile sites there or to dispose of the 
Castro regime. 
3. The Soviet Union is unable to engage in sustained, success-
ful intervention to protect her missile sites or prop up 
Castro's government in the face of U.S. military interven-
tion, unless the threat of nuclear war was utilized by the 
Soviet Union. In that case the capacity of the Soviets to 
27Martin Shubik, ed., Readings in Game Theory and Political 
Behavior (Garden City, N.Y., 1954), p. 6. 
28Ibid. 
intervene successfully to protect their missile sites and 
Castro's government would be determined by the American 
perception of the threat and thus cannot be specified as 
a rule of the game. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE PAYOFF MATRIX FOR THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS GAME 
In constructing the payoff matrix, the Soviet Union is Player!;_ and 
the United States is Player 1!· The utilities will represent the percep-
tions which the players each have of their own payoffs. Within the 
cells or boxes of the matrix are the outcomes of simultaneous moves. We 
shall assume that each player correctly perceives the payoff of the 
other, in other words, he knows the value assigned to each payoff by the 
other player. However, this assumption cannot be made in situations 
involving outcomes of sequentipl moves involving a threat. In that cas~ 
a player can only be assumed to know his own utilities. 1 
The sequential section of the payoff matrix includes submatrices 
concerned with sequential moves. In including submatrices some attempt 
is made in the representation of the matrix to include the effects of 
"preplay" communication on the preferences of the players. 2 This is 
crucial, for without a modification of this type, Schelling's contribu-
tions to game theory could not be incorporated into the matrix. Thus, 
we will handle threats and promises and, in this way, make game-theoretic 
conceptualizations empirically relevant to the study of conflict. 
Strategy! for each player is inaction. The submatrix for the 




coincidence of moves 2,1 through 2.6 for each player represent simultan--- --.--
eous actions by the two parties. This means that the moves are under-
taken by each player with the belief that he is moving first, but this 
in fact results in simultaneous choices. The usual circumstance in 
traditional game theory is simultaneous decision. 
Strategy moves l.:..!. through 3.8 for each player represent decisions 
to await the move of the other player, then to react in a predetermined 
manner. The submatrices including these strategies thus represent 
sequential actions. It follows, then, that three types of action may be 
followed by either player: inaction, an attempt to move first, or a 
decision to move second. 
The matrix does not consider the possibility that each player might 
indefinitely await the move of the other. (This would be the coinci-
dence of strategies l.:..!. through 1:..§. for each player). The possibility 
of mutual inaction is considered (lJ:.), but this contingency, that one 
or both players would already have a set of alternatives at hand, yet 
never use one of them seems highly unlikely. 3 Indeed, the fact that 
mutual (l.z.1) would be distinctly disadvantageous to Player B (the United 
States) argues strongly that the U.S. would choose a "first move" 
strategy if it became convinced that the Soviet strategy had been 
selected from among 3.1 through 1:..§.• 
Similarly, it should be noted that the game probably would not be 
considered two-person if both "original" players selected strategy.!_, 
although this might have been a possible solution. If both parties 
decided against any action at all, other parties to the conflict might 
3Ibid., P• 448. 
SIMULTANEOUS MOVES PLAYER B "A, THEN B" 
""- l 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 · 3.8 
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have entered the conflict, such as Castro's government, but the chances 
of this occurring were very small. If the characterization of the game 
as two-person is meaningful, logic suggests that .!.z.!. will not be the 
"solution." It is clearly not the solution in the fonnal game-theoretic 
sense. 
The moves considered in the payoff matrix are as follows: 
Players! (u.s.s.R.) and B (U.S.A.) 
1 Inaction 
2 I will move first: 
2.1 Renounce unilateral action, press for bilateral 
agreement via the United Nations. 
2.2 Press for diplomatic settlement to resolve crisis, but 
threaten nuclear retaliation if either party intervenes 
in Cuba. 
2.3 Press for bilateral agreement accompanied by threats of 
military intervention, but execute indirect military 
action. 
2.4 Threaten and inunediately execute military intervention. 
2.5 Do not threaten intervention but in fact execute it. 
2.6 Order full nuclear strike. 
3 I will await the move of 
Player~: 
3.1 If B chooses 1, then 
I select 2. 5. -
3.2 If B chooses 2.1, then 
I select 2.1.~ 
3.3 If B chooses 2.2, then 
I select 2.2.~-. 
3.4 If B chooses 2.3, then 
I select 2.2.~ 
3.5 If B chooses 2.4, then 
I select 2.2.~-
3 I will await the move of 
Player!: 
3.1 If A chooses.!., then 
I select 2.5. 
3.2 If A chooses 2.1, then 
I select 2.3.~ 
3.3 If! chooses 2.2, then 
I select 2.3. 
3.4 If! chooses 2.3, then 
I select 2.3. 
3.5 If! chooses l!i, then 
I select 2.3. 
3.6 If~ chooses 1:2_, then 
I select 2.2. 
3.7 If B chooses either 2.4 
or 2.5, then I select 
2.2:--
3.8 If B chooses 2.6, then 
I select 2.6.~ 
~ 
3.6 If! chooses 1:2_, then 
I select 2.3. 
3.7 If A chooses either 2.4 
or 2.5, then I select 
2.5 
3.8 If A chooses 2.6, then 
I select 2.6.~-
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Many qualifying statements need to be made regarding this listing 
of strategies and the accompanying payoff (Figure 2). First, these 
moves obviously do not exhaust the logical actions that might have been 
feasible and/or actively considered by the Soviet Union and the United 
States in the Cuban missile crisis. Needless to say, the characteriza-
tion of likely strategies rests on incomplete information. 
The catalogues of strategies are certainly not identical for both 
players. In particular, note that in the event of prior U.S. action of 
any kind, the Soviet Union probably would not have considered military 
intervention in Cuba. Of course, if Russia were willing to commit 
suicide over the Cuban missile crisis, this would not hold true. This 
analysis, also, does not consider the possibility of a retaliatory 
Soviet intervention in Berlin because of the complexities involved in 
handling this in the strategy part of payoff matrix. Given that Cuba 
lay within the American sphere of influence, and definitely in the 
American's critical boundary in 1962, it seems reasonable to provide 
Player~ in this game with the option for subsequent intervention in the 
face of prior Soviet intervention. That is, the United States would 
probably have risked a direct military confrontation with the Soviet 
Union over the missile crisis. However, this has not been established 
with 100% certainty, and also the probability of Soviet military inter-
vention in Cuba to protect the missile silos and Castro's government was 
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very slight given the distance of Cuba from the Soviet's home base. 
Sec~md, the nature of the hypothetical "armed intervention'' refer-
red to in the listings of strategies is difficult to explicate. For 
our purposes this intervention could have ranged from limited military 
action to surgical air strike, to the physical transfer of men and 
equipment to Cuba. Clearly, there are other forms of intervention and 
these were probably considered in Washington and Moscow during the fall 
of 1962. Similarly, the scale of military intervention is important, 
but troublesome, when abstracting the many strategies possible for the 
United States and the Soviet Union. For example, does the U.S. Naval 
blockade equate with our use of military intervention? The answer to 
this question is yes, because the use of indirect military action to 
force the Soviet missiles out of Cuba was a form of intervention. How-
ever, this form of intervention was not a sure fire strategy for forcing 
the Soviets' hand and, thus, is given a smaller utility value than 
direct military intervention, which would have assured the removal of 
the missiles, but at the higher risk of nuclear war and, thus, a reduced 
payoff. Also, the Soviet Union already had troops in Cuba at the time 
of the missile crisis. Would not this already constitute some form of 
intervention? This study does not consider the Soviet presence in Cuba 
a form of intervention because more troops than the Russians could 
probably supply were needed to checkmate American military intervention. 
Thus, Soviet intervention would be present if the Soviet Union directly 
intervened to protect their missile sites or if they pressured the 
United States into inaction by indirect military action. The complexity 
of game theory requires us to take this admittedly narrow view of the 
missile crisis. Lastly, direct American intervention would be present 
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if the missile sites were destroyed by air or ground invasion, since 
this seemed to be one of the real alternatives open to the United 
States. 
Third, some of the strategies in this game involve only, or primar-
ily, the use of threats or conunitments. The main form of cooperative 
behavior considered is explicit bargaining encompassing threats. For 
purposes of this analysis, we believe this conforms to the way the most 
crucial events occurred in 1962 between the United States and the Soviet 
Uni9n. The other game models (tacit bargaining game and the explicit 
bargaining game involving promises) will be presented for strictly 
comparative and analogous reasons. 
A fourth point of clarification concerning the nature of the 
strategies involves assumptions dealing with expectations and percep-
tions. In any sequential-move situation involving threats, there is a 
crucial uncertainty encompassing the players' respective perceptions of 
4 the threats. Further, the question can be asked, what probability 
calculation is associated with Player~ perception of a threat by 
Player!, and vice versa? Or how closely does a perceived payoff under 
an opponent's threat of move X correspond with the perceived payoff if 
the opponent actually makes move X? 
The significance of a threat does not rely solely upon the subjec-
tive probability in the mind of the threatened party that it will be 
5 carried out. It depends also on the size of the threat itself, the 
prospective disutility to the threatened party if the threat is carried 
4Ibid., P• 450 
5Ibid. 
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out. Yet, these two factors are not independent. For instance, Kenneth 
Boulding hypothesizes that, beyond a certain point, the relationship 
becomes inverse: the greater magnitude, the less the subjective proba-
b ·1· 6 1 ity. According to Boulding, a smaller threat in certain cases is 
7 likely to have a greater effect on the threatened. 
In Figure 2, payoffs for cells representing sequential moves 
involving threats have been calculated according to the following 
scheme: 
If Player A (the Soviet Union) threatens first, Player B will 
calculate that the threatened action will take place with the 
probability of .4; a subsequent threat by Player B will be 
perceived by Player! as occurring with the probability of :l..· 
If Play$r B threatens first, Player A will calculate that the 
threatened-action will take place with P=.8; a subsequent 
threat by Player! will be perceived as"""oc"curring with P=.5. 
If Player A executes limited military intervention first, a 
subsequent-threat by Player B to execute limited military 
intervention will be perceived as occurring by Player! with 
P=.8. 
If Player! executes limited military intervention first, a 
subsequent threat by Player A to execute limited military 
intervention will be perceived as occurring by Player~ with 
P=.4. 
If Player! acts (intervenes) first, a subsequent threat to 
intervene by Player B will be perceived by Player A as occur-
ring with~· -
If Player! acts (intervenes) first, a subsequent threat to 
intervene by Player A will be perceived by Player Bas occur-
ing with~· -
If the players threaten simultaneously, the threats will be 
perceived as occurring with the same probabilities as if each 
threat had occurred first~ 
If Player A threatens Player B, simultaneously with interven-
tion by Pliyer !, Player B will assign a probability of~ 
6Boulding, P• 255. 
7Ibid. 
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to Player A's threat. 
If Player B threatens Player A, simultaneously with interven-
tion by Player A, Player A will assign a probability of .9 to 
Player~ threat.8 -
Thus, this analysis rests on the assumption that the Soviet Union 
would have had slightly better cause to treat as valid a threat of 
intervention by the United States than would the United States in evalu-
ating a Soviet threat. Even a cursory examination of the record of the 
two nations in carrying out threats and promises suggests that the U.S. 
performance is at least as consistent as that of the Soviet Union. 9 On 
the other hand, it is assumed that a Soviet threat to intervene mili-
tarily, made after American intervention, would be treated more casually 
than a corresponding American threat subsequent to Soviet intervention. 
This assumption is based on the apparent fact that the removal of 
missiles from Cuba was much more important to the Americans than to the 
Soviets, because Cuba lay within the United States' critical boundary. 
The Americans seemingly would have more willingly risked a general 
military conflict over the Cuban missile crisis. 
A major relationship exists between the sequence of moves in a game 
and the credibility of threats. The ability to grab the initiative in a 
conflict situation may neutralize or even reverse the strategic advan-
tage otherwise enjoyed by a (physically) more powerful opponent. This 
means an apparently weaker party in a bargaining situation often has 
greater influence on the outcome, provided it can threaten or commit 
8The scheme above is arbitrary and is based in part on a statement 
reported to have been said by President Kennedy that the odds of nuclear 
war were~ in the Cuban missile crisis, in Theodore Sorensen's Kennedy, 
P• 705. 
9 Welsh, p. 451. 
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itself to a given position prior to any threat or action by the other 
party. One of the many tactical positions facing a potentially powerful 
threatener, therefore, is how to get into a position in which he gives 
up freedom of action at the onset, thereby making his threats more 
believable. 
Another relationship existing between the sequence of moves and 
credibility of threats is mentioned below. As will be suggested in more 
detail later, the Soviet Union was generally at something of a bargain~ 
ing disadvantage vis-a-vis the United States. 
An early credible threat of military intervention by the Soviet 
Union might have been the most effective means of influencing the out-
come of the conflict favorably to its interests; yet, the prior Soviet 
threat of nuclear retaliation (if the U.S. intervened in Cuba) may have 
alleviated the comparative Soviet disadvantage of not being able to 
issue a threat before the initial United States' response. Threats and 
intervention may, of course, be quite distinct. But for threats to be 
credible, the threatened party must perceive relatively high congruence 
between intentions and threats. The Kennedy quarantine probably provid-
ed such congruence between threat and potential action. 
A few words of explanation of the payoff matrix is necessary, deal-
ing mainly with absolute values assigned to outcomes. In this game the 
application of payoff values has been assigned subjectively. It is 
argued here that the analysis is worthwhile arbitrariness notwithstand-
ing. However, it should be stressed again that, if game theory is to 
develop an inductive theory of conflict, efforts must be made to derive 
payoff values empirically. 




1. Allowed by U.S. inaction to continue missile buildup•+ 2 
2. Successful armed intervention in Cuba to protect 
missile buildup , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ••• +15 
3. Successful armed intervention in Cuba to protect 
missile buildup without prior threat •• +14 
4. Execute indirect military action that causes the U.S. 
to back down allowing missile buildup to continue •• +11 
5. Agree to remove offensive weapons from Cuba ••• -11 
6. Support the concept of U.N. action without uni-
lateral threats ... + 2 
Support the concept of U.N. action coupled with 
Soviet threats . + 1 
7. Military confrontation with U.S. over Cuban missile 
crisis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • -25 
Player~ (U.S.A.) 
1. Permit missile buildup to continue •••••••••• -15 
2. Permit missile buildup to continue, bolstered by 
Soviet reinforcements • -25 
3. Successful military intervention to remove offensive 
weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +15 
4. Successful military intervention to remove offensive 
weapons, no prior threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +14 
5. Execute indirect military action that causes Soviets 
to withdraw offensive weapons. Utilize threats ••• +11 
6. Support U.N. action for propaganda value ••••••• + 1 
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7. Military confrontation with the U.S.S.R. over the 
Cuban missile crisis •• •• -25 
For outcomes involving threats, payoffs are calculated by multiply-
ing values by probabilities. The calculation procedure varies slightly 
according to the sequence and configuration of moves. First, let us \ 
take the case of a threat following intervention by the other player. 
For example, examine the cell in the lower left hand ("B, then "A) sub~ 
matrix showing the intersection of Player~ subsequent strategy 1...:.1 
with Player~ prior move~· The payoffs shown are .:1.Q for! and Q 
for B. The payoff for Player! (the United States) involves no proba-
bility calculation. Player! knows what Player~ has done, for~ has 
announced and executed intervention. Thus the value to A is.:.!.!., the 
utility of moving Soviet offensive weapons out of Cuba, less +1, the 
value of advocating United Nations action, or -1.0. Player~ payoff, 
however, involves a probability calculation, since A's strategy in this 
case 3.5 involves a threat. We have assigned a probability of .:2_ to a 
threat by Player A (the Soviet Union) subsequent to intervention by 
. -
Player~ (the United States). Thus ~.payoff equals +15 (successful 
military intervention to remove Soviet offensive weapons) less the value 
of subsequent Soviet military intervention and resulting Soviet-American 
confrontation = .::12,, times its probability .:2_ or .::1:2.· The payoff to 
Player~, therefore, is +15 minus -15 = O. 
A second illustration might deal with a threat by one player 
followed by~ threat by the other. In this case the payoffs for both 
players involve probability calculations. Examine the cell immediateiy 
above the one we have been discussing. This is the cell showing the 
intersection of Player A's subsequent strategy 1!d. with Player B's priof· 
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strategy 1:1.· In this case, the United States (Player.!!) has threatened 
intervention, and the Soviet Union (Player!:) responds by pressing for a 
diplomatic settlement to the crisis, but also threatens military inter-
vention to the extent of nuclear retaliation against U.S. intervention 
ih Cuba. As shown, the payoff for! is -8, for B -12.5. Player~ 
payoff is equal to the value of the outcome if.!! does intervene -11, 
less +1 for supporting the U.N., times the probability associated with 
the threatened move .8 = -8. Similarly, Player~ payoff is equal to 
the value of the outcome if A does intervene -25 times its probability 
.5 = -12.5. 
A third type of calculation is necessary in the case of simultan-. 
eous threats. Examine the payoff 2.2,2.2 in the simultaneous-move 
submatrix. Player~ payoff is ::l:.!:!· This is obtained by (a) sub-
tracting the U.N. "bonus" point +1 from the value of American interven-
tion.:.!.!., and multiplying the result by its probability :J!.; (b) assign-
ing the residual probability .!l to the value of the resulting situation 
if the Americans (Player.!!) did !!2.!:, intervene +3, and multiplying these 
values; and (c) summing up results of step (a) and (b). The payoff to 
Player.!! is calculated similarly and comes out -1. 
A catalogue of the calculations made for every move in the payoff 
matl;'ix for the explicit bargaining game encompassing threats, or the 
main inductive game model for the Cuban missile crisis, is contained in 
Appendix A of this report. 
Before examining the "comparative rationality estimates" of the 
players in our main Cuban game, a short detour will be made to briefly 
develop two other bargaining models previously mentioned. These models 




PLAYER B "A, THEN B" 
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 
-15 -llt +11 tl5 +25 +15 
1 
+2 +2 -11 -11 -25 -11 
-15 -llt +10 +15 +25 +11 
2.1 
-+4 +3 -9 -9 -23 -9 
-15 -llt +10 +15 -25 +15 
2.2 
+10 H-10 +9 · ;..10 -25 +10 
-25 -2lt -25 -25 -25 +11 
2.3 
+15 H-15 -25 -25 -25 +9 
-25 -23 -25 -25 -25 -2.': 
< 2.4 
~ +25 H-25 -25 -25 -25 -25 
~ 3.1 ...:i 
ll,i 
-25 I\ / +15 
3.2 





+15 I/ I\ -9 
3.5 
-25 / I\ -25 
"B, THEN A" 
Figure 3. Payoff Matrix for the Tacit Cuban Game 
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The first model to be constructed is a tacit bargaining situation. 
Basically, the moves considered in a tacit game cannot be communicated 
and ~re reached through logic and common sense. Five such moves are 
listed in our tacit Cuban game: inactivity, United Nations action, 
limited military action or intervention, direct military intervention, 
anq nuclear strike. All these moves are made without the benefit of 
threats, commitments, or promises. The moves considered in the payoff 
matrix are borrowed from the main game and are as follows: 
Players~ (u.s.s.R.) and~ (U.S.A.) 
1 Inaction 
2 I will move first: 
2.1 Renounce unilateral action, back U.N. 
2.2 Execute limited or indirect military action. 
2.3 Execute direct military intervention in Cuba. 
2.4 Order full nuclear strike. 
3 I will await the move of 
Player~: 
3.1 If B chooses 1, then 
I select 2.3.-
3.2 If~ chooses 2.1, then 
I select 2.1. 
3.3 If~ chooses 2.2, then 
I select 1:.1.· 
3.4 If B chooses £!l, then 
I select 2.1. 
~
3.5 If B chooses 2.4, then 
I select 2.4.---
3 I will await the move of 
Player~: 
3.1 If~ chooses!, then 
I select 2.3. 
3.2 If~ chooses~, then 
I select 2.2. 
3.3 If~ chooses 2.2, then 
I select 2.3. 
3.4 If~ chooses £!l, then 
I select 2.3. 
3.5 If A chooses 2.2, then 
I select 2.4.---
The values are likewise borrowed from the main game and i~terjected 
into the payoff matrix. Also, the moves are identically calculated as 
they were for Figure 2, minus the effect of threats. Any significance 
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attached to the moves in Figure 3 will _.be deferred until the next 
chapter, where short-run equilibrium points will be calculated and 
discussed. 
A second model deals with an explicit bargaining situation involv-
ing promises. This model will only consider four courses of action or 
moves. This seems appropriate because of the limited number of possible 
promises available to the parties for resolving the Cuban missile 
crisis. 
The moves considered in the payoff matrix are as follows: 
i. I will .!!2! promise to remove missiles (U,S.S.R.). 
ii. I will promise to remove missiles (U.S.S.R.). 
I. I will .!!2! promise .!!2! to invade Cuba and end my naval 
quarantine (U.S.A.). 
II. I will promise not to invade Cuba and end my quarantine 
(U.S.A.). 
The payoff matrix also borrows values from the main game and they 








Figure 4. Payoff Matrix for 
Explicit Cuban Game 
Involving Promises 
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T~e discussion of the significance, if any, of this model will be 
delayed until the next chapter, where possible saddle points will be 
discussed. This model is a 2 X 2 traditional game model, so its 
results should not be overstressed. 10 
10schelling, Strategy of Conflict, p. 138. 
CHAPTER VI 
COMPARATIVE RATIONALITY ESTIMATES OF 
THE PLAYERS' BEHAVIOR 
With the construction of the payoff matrix in the preceding chap= 
ter, it is now feasible to attempt comparative rationality estimates of 
the behaviors of the two players. The game-theory model will be 
employed to predict which course of action should have peen followed by 
each player. The predictions of the model will then be compared and 
contrasted with the actual behavior of the Soviet Union and the United 
States during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Hopefully, such a 
comparison will shed light on those characteristics of the conflict 
which are highlighted by game-theoretic analysis. 
An important distinction between predictive and prescriptive uses 
of the model must first be made. The purpose is not to question, "What 
1 should the players have done?" That is a prescriptive question imply-
ing an attribute of "correctness" to the model. Such questions are 
beyond the scope of this analysis and indeed most political analyses. 
The main concern in what follows is to predict behavior, given a set of 
explicit assumptions. 
A closer look at the payoff matrix provides a point of departure 
for comparative rationality estimates (or asking which set of available 
1 Welsh, p. 453. 
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courses of action seems most likely to have been optimum for the parties 
to the conflict, given the specified or assumed goals for each). 2 The 
following observations are suggested by the matrix: 
1. Player~ (the United States) at first appears to begin the game 
at something of a disadvantage. The events occurring in the Cuban area 
in late October of 1962 were forcing the U.S. to take a move, for mutual 
inaction by both players would have resulted in an absolute loss and 
relative disadvantage for Player~· The only position payoff for Player 
Bin the simultaneous-moves segment of the matrix is in the pursuit of 
strategy 2.3, ~, or 2.5, ranging from indirect intervention to direct 
intervention. However, these are the strategies of the highest risk, as 
they assume the possibility of simultaneous Soviet intervention or 
nuclear attack on the United States. 
2. Player! (the Soviet Union) could come out ahead with any of 
its simultaneous-move strategies, depending on the strategy selected by 
Player~· Player!, however, would suffer absolute loss and/or relative 
disadvantage if Player~ should choose either~, 2.4, or 2.5, the only 
strategies offering Player~ any chance of gain, or even relative advan-
tage. Therefore, the simultaneous-moves segment of the matrix appears 
to represent a case of near pure conflict. 
3. Player~ would seem ill-advised to knowingly permit Player! to 
move first, since the only prior move by! which would result in gain 
and advantage for & is A's strategy 1:.1., for which B's response is 3.2, 
o,; in other words £:1.• If the Soviet Union commits itself to working 
through the United Nations and avoiding unilateral action, the United 
2Ibid., p. 420. 
States could execute limited military intervention (naval blockade) 
without an obvious serious risk. 
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According to the matrix, there is one other condition of prior 
Soviet action under which the United States would realize a slight rela-
tive advantage while suffering a minor absolute loss. This is under 
Player B's strategy 3.6, which is a threat to intervene after unan-
nounced intervention by Player!, 2.5. At first glance this cell of the 
matrix seems unrealistic. If the Soviet Union intervenes first, would 
it be reasonable to assume that the U.S. could achieve relative advan-
tage merely by threatening also to send troops into Cuba or bomb the 
missile sites? Game theory suggests that this may indeed be the case, 
depending on the probability the Soviet decision-makers gave to the 
American threat. We have assigned a probability of .!-2. to American 
threats subsequent to Soviet intervention. Thus, the payoff 2.5, 3.6 to 
the Soviet Union is the value of reinforcing missile sites +14 plus the 
value of Soviet-American military confrontation -25, times its probabil-
ity or -22.5. The payoff for the Soviet Union, thus, is -8.5. The 
payoff to the U.S. is calculated similarly and comes out at +1. There 
will be no war, since the American strategy in this case, at least 
temporarily, is only to threaten intervention, and Player l, the U.S., 
has gained a relative advantage by utilizing a threat, even though the 
threat came after an apparently decisive u.s.s.R. action. What all this 
suggests is that a rational U.S.S.R. would have withdrawn its reinforce-
ments, including the other personnel and offensive weapons, placed as a 
result of its bold action, in the face of a subsequent threat by the 
United States to intervene. 
4. Similarly, if Player B concedes the first move, Player! can 
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achieve absolute gain only if~ chooses.£.:..!. or 2.2. That is, if the 
Soviet Union awaits an American move, the U.S.S.R. would experience a 
positive payoff only if the United States chooses to do nothing, or work 
only for a United Nations involvement. The latter course of action 
would seem to have been unacceptable to the U.S., for there was a real 
q~estion as to whether the U.N. would or could intercede effectively on 
behalf of the U.S. to force the missiles out of Cuba. Furthermore, 
inaction was obviously illogical for the United States. The Soviet 
Union then could not achieve relative advantage unless the prior 
American move was other than 1:1., 2.4 or 2.5. 
5. It is clear, then, that Player~ (the United States) can bene-
fit only by choosing moves 2.3, 2.4 or 2.5, sooner or later. The 
question is merely when. There is considerable reason to believe that 
the U.S. must seize the initiative and take the first move. Permitting 
the Soviet Union to move first eliminates the chance the United States 
has to use any of its strategies rationally. The payoff matrix sug-
gests, on the other hand, that Player B's preferred outcome is 2.1, 2.!l,, 
so the best possible American outcome would be a prior Soviet Union 
cormnitment to work through the U.N., followed by limited military inter-
vention and threats of direct intervention by the United States. This 
ideal solution was not, in fact, completely obtained; yet was approxi-
mated in the 1962 solution to the crisis. From the American perspec-
tive, however, the difficulty is that if the Soviet Union is permitted 
to move first it will probably not choose strategy.£.:..!.· 
6. Let us assume, then, that Player! (the Soviet Union) recog-
nizes that Player B's preferred strategy is 3.2. This yields initia-
tives to the Soviet Union, and Player! might consider a strategy other 
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than 2.1. Indeed, the game-theory model suggests that, if permitted to 
move first, Player A would select strategy 2.2, that is to press for a 
diplomatic settlement, but threaten nuclear retaliation for U.S. inter~ 
vention in Cuba. This strategy yields a comparatively small loss for 
Player! while producing a small gain for Player~· We must assume, 
however, that Player~ can and does pursue the same line of reasoning. 
Having seen that Player! could cause an unfavorable outcome for Player 
~ by moving first and selecting 1=1_, Player~ would have to move first 
or simultaneously with Player!, since neither player can be certain 
that his opponent will not move first. Under this condition, Player~ 
must choose 1:.1., 2.4 or 2.5, and Player! (the Soviet Union) must accept 
an absolute loss. Player~, the United States, having acted first or 
simultaneously will select from the limited to direct intervention 
strategy. The Soviet Union could "balance" the payoffs only by opting 
for a direct military confrontation with the U.S. and produce an unde-
termined loss to both players. Thus, for Player!, strategy 2.2, 
supporting a diplomatic settlement, but threatening nuclear retaliation 
if Player~ intervenes directly in Cuba, appears to be a dominant 
strategy. It is important whether Player! moves before, simultaneously 
with, or after Player~' but knowledge of Player~ intentions would 
not alter Player~ preferred strategy. In this sense, 2.2 is Player 
A's "minimax" strategy. 
7. We may suppose, then, that Player~ recognizes that Player! 
will select 2.2. Player~ may settle for 2.3 as his basic strategy, for 
2.4 or 2.5 could bring about the incalculable risk of nuclear war. The 
sequence of moves is important. The payoff for Player~ is +1 if he 
moves before or with Player!; however, a prior move by Player! might 
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block Player B's chance to use his limited intervention strategy ration-
ally. Thus, the United States would be driven into an early selection 
of 2.3, limited intervention with threats. The solution -- 3.4, 2.3 --
approximates the policies actually pursued by the United States and the 
Soviet Union in Cuba in 1962. 
It must be emphasized that the "solution".presented in this game is 
not a pure strategy solution in the strict game-theoretic sense; the 
game has no long-range equlibrium point and the optimum choices for both 
players depend very much upon perceptions of intentions and/or threats 
3 by each player. Nevertheless, if we make the necessary assumptions 
concerning perceptions of intentions, the one outcome produced is a 
"focal-point solution," as Schelling calls it. 
The probable convergence of expectations on one of these ''focal-
point solutions" can be demonstrated by direct graph analysis. 4 For 
this, the matrix is modified to the form appearing in Figure 5. The 
nodes of the graph represent intersections of strategies. For the 
simultaneous-move area of the graph, vertical arrows indicate Player A's 
preferences, and the horizontal arrows show Player B's preferences, 
while bars across lines of the graph indicate the absence of preferences 
between adjacent nodes of the graph. 5 For sequential moves, the arrows 
show the preferences of the player who moves first. 
In Conflict and Defense, Boulding suggests that there may be a 
"shortsighted" equilibria in non-zero-sum games without pure-strategy 
3Ibid., P• 456. 
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saddle points. 6 While these equilibria do not qualify as game-theoretic 
solutions, they may repreE:;ent "conunon sense" solutions. Indeed, the 
shortsighted equilibria may .be useful as operational indices of Schel-
ling's focal point solutions. 7 They could represent outcomes reached 
through either explicit or tacit bargaining. 
Complicated non-zero-sum games generally have shortsighted equi-
libria. As Figure 5 shows, the Cuban game has six such equilibria 
denoted as large dots. 
All of the shortsighted equilibria are meaningful and dependent on 
certain contingencies. One of the six, it should be noted, is the 
solution arrived at earlier 8 3.4, £:1.• Since this strategy has been 
already discussed, the examination of other shortsighted equilibria will 
follow: (1) If either the U.S. or the u.s.s.R. settles on 1:1., 2.4 or 
2.4, 2.1 equilibrium points, this strategy could easily lead to nuclear 
war, for it is doubtful that either party would be content with 2.1 if 
the other directly intervenes. 
(2) Another equilibrium point is 2.4, £:1.• This move was Soviet 
intervention to reinforce the missile sites while the U.S. executed 
limited military intervention coupled with threats. Since the odds 
against Soviet intervention to protect her developing strategic base in 
Cuba were small, this equilibrium point is of little value in this 
particular game model. In contract, if the game was a tacit bargaining 
game in which the Soviet Union moved first and the United States second 
6Ibid. 
7 Welsh, p. 458. 
8 
See PP• 76- 77. 
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to force the missiles out of Cuba, this equilibrium point would be quite 
significant. This game is concerned, however, with the events taking 
place after October 14 and concentrates on the explicit nature of the 
conflict situation. 
(3) and (4) Two other equilibria remain 3.2, 2.1 and 2.3, 3.4. The 
first point represents the Soviet appeal for U.N. action while the U.S. 
executes limited military intervention coupled with threats. This is 
close to the actual policies followed by both governments, but does not 
account for the Soviet threats indirectly or directly communicated. The 
last point or 2.3, ~ represents Soviet limited intervention with 
strong threats followed by the same action by the U.S. Had this policy 
been carried out, one could well imagine a naval confronation or some 
other form of confrontation. This equilibrium point certainly is any-
thing but logically compelling for resolving the crisis. 
Before concluding this chapter one general limitation on the use of 
directed graph analysis needs to be underscored. First, which short-
sighted equilibrium emerges as the final outcome depends on (1) the 
order of moves in the game, and (2) where one "turns" on the conflict 
system; i.e., the point at which one begins to analyze the preference 
d . 9 ynam1.cs. To repeat, complex non-zero-sum games usually have numerous 
shortsighted equilibria. 
Finally, an attempt is made to compare the equilibria points 
present, if any, in the other game models, Figure 6 and 7. 
In the model involving tacit bargaining, the directed graph in 
Figure 6 shows the following relationships with the main game. First of 
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all, one must answer the question of whether or not the players arrived 
at the same solution without communication of threats as with communi-
cation. In the directed graph for the tacit game there are six short-
sighted equilibria, none of which approximates the solution arrived at 
in the main game. Indeed, if these equilibria were settled upon as a 
policy during the crisis, we would have had moves ranging ,from nuclear 
strike to direct intervention had the other party chosen either U.N. 
action or limited intervention. Out of the six equilibria derived, only 
one 2.3, 2.2 is approximately the same as 2.4, 2.3 in the main Cuban - - . --· -- ' 
game. This involves direct intervention by Player! simultan~ous with 
limited intervention by Player~· Schelling's postulate that players 
sometimes arrive at the same decision without communication seems woe-
fully out of place in the Cuban crisis. Without communication between 
the Soviet and American governments, the risk of a nuclear war as a 
result of a preemptive strike or direct intervention in Cuba would have 
increased significantly. 
The last model we want to briefly consider concerns the explicit 
bargaining situation involving promises. In Figure 7 there is an equi-
librium point, for the arrows chase each other to 1,2.1; that is, the 
United States will promise not to invade Cuba and to end the quaranti.ne 
in return for Soviet inaction. This clearly was not the solution to the 
Cuban crisis as time unfolded. Unless different values are assigned for 
Soviet actions or promises, there seems to be no solution to this 
particular game that would be acceptable to the parties involved. Yet, 
.. 
the Sovi.ets must eventually promise to remove the missiles or suffer 











The purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis that an induc-
tive game model could be applied descriptively to study situations of 
international conflict. The game-theoretic conceptualization o.f the 
Cuban missile crisi~ was to provide the instrument for employing and 
testing Professor Welsh's basic inductive model. The apparatus of our 
game model was successfully applied and the Cuban missile crisis, a 
situation of i_nternational conflict, proved amenable to inductive analy-
sis. All the major requirements for constructing an inductive game 
model were met, in that the basic moves, values or utilities and payoff 
matrix were devised and logically implemented in the game. 
A corollary to the main hypothesis was that a game-theoretic 
conceptualization of the Cuban missile crisis would establish the signi-
ficant alternatives and solutions available to the United States and the 
Soviet Union, so that the predictions of the game model should then have 
determined whether or not the players acted rationally in resolving this 
crisis. 
According to the solutions offered in the main model, our players 
did indeed act rationally given the range'of basic moves stipulated and 
their values in the payoff matrix. Had either player settled on a 
short-range solution other than 3.4, 2;3 (the U.S. moves first and 
--.--- --
presses for bilateral agreement accompanied by threats of military 
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intervention, but executes limited military intervention, while the 
U.S.S.R. presses for diplomatic settlement to resolve the crisis, but 
threatens nuclear retaliation if the U.S. intervenes directly in Cuba), 
the odds for nuclear war would have increased sharply. The sequential 
section of the game model also predicted the resolution of the crisis as 
opposed to the solutions offered by the simultaneous section or the 
traditional part of the game model, which if followed, could have led to 
a nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
In other words, if the traditional game strategists in the U.S. military 
had been heeded, probably military intervention or direct invasion would 
have been resorted to in Cuba, however, with the communication of 
threats between the players in the sequential part of our model, 
different perceptions of the payoff matrix were possible; and the solu-
tion provided closely resembled the final compromise arrived at by the 
Soviet and American goverrnnents. 
In the context of the game model, we need next to ask whether or 
not there was a winner in the Cuban missile crisis. The results of our 
game when compared to the actual behavior of the Soviet and American 
governments shows the U.S. achieved a small gain in the 3.4, 2.3 solu~ 
tion, or the solution that closely resembles the policies followed by 
both goverrnnents. The small gain came about in the period of October 
14 - 28, yet, if the game could be extended to the presept, the Soviet 
policy during the Cuban missile crisis might well be considered the 
winner in this crisis based on the "no invasion" pledge she obtained 
from the Americans. This type of conjecture, however, is beyond the 
scope of our inductive game model. Certainly, the predictions of the 
descriptive game model seem to discredit those political scientists who 
claim that the Cuban missile crisis was a major foreign policy victory 
for the Kennedy Administration in 1962. 
86 
Overall, many improvements are needed before inductive game models 
can provide an empirical basis for studying international conflict. For 
example, the arbitrary selection of numerical utilities in the payoff 
matrix remains a thorn even in Welsh's inductive game model. Also, 
there are almost as many limitations and problems attendent to using 
game theory as there are benefits to be accrued. In the Cuban game the 
logical and conceptual limitations of game theory prevented us from 
assessing the impact of past games on the crisis, such as the Berlin 
crises and the Bay of Pigs invasion, not to mention the immediate possi= 
bility of a Berlin Blockade in the listing of moves in the game. 
Similarly, the exact nature of the bargaining game model unduly 
restricts the picture of the missile crisis because the game was basi~ 
cally tacit in nature before October 14 and basically explicit after 
that date. This in turn, limits the scope of the crisis to too small a 
time span. 
In spite of these problems, inductive game models appear to provide 
a legitimate framework for conceptualizing and examining international 
conflicts. This is especially true if such studies are limited to 
descriptive applications in international relations. After all, the 
model did "predict" a.possible solution to the Cuban missile crisis that 
approximated the actual behavior of the Soviet and American governments. 
However, Welsh's prediction that this kind of analysis will eventually 
lead toward an empirically based, inductive theory of games for studying 
international conflict appears to be overly optimistic at the present 
time. 
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APPENDIX 
A CATALOGUE FOR IDVES INVOLVING CALCULATIONS 
IN THE PAYOFF MATRIX 
1. A's payoff for ..!., is il or the value of being allowed to continue 
the ~issile buildup; B's payoff for 1~ is -15 or the value of 
allowing the missile buildup to continue. 
2. A's payoff for 1, is +2 or the same value as last move; B's payoff 
for 2,.1 is -14 or thevalue of allowing the missile buildup to 
continue -15 plus:!::.!. for supporting U.N. action. 
3. A's payoff for 1, is +2 or the same value as last move; B's payoff 
for 2.2 is -1.4-or thesame value as last move. 
4. A's payoff for.!,, is -11 or the value of being forced to remove 
missiles; B's payoff for 2.3 is +11 or the value of forcing Soviet 
missiles o~of Cuba by indirect military action. 
5. A's payoff for 1, is -11 or the same value, as last move; B's payoff 
for 2.4 is +15 or the7alue of successfully intervening in Cuba to 
remove missiies with prior warning. 
6. A's payoff for 1, is -11 or the same .value as last move; B's payoff 
for 2.5 is +14 or thesame value as last move minus +1 fo~ot 
giving prior warning. 
7. A's payoff for 1, is -25 or the value of allowing itself to be 
destroyed by nu'Zlear strike; B's payoff for 2. 6 i.s +25 or the value 
of successful nuclear strike against the Soviet Union without 
response. 
8. A's payoff for 2.1 is +4 or the value of being allowed to continue 
the missile buildup +2~minus +1 for B I s supporting U .N. action; 
B's payoff for 1, is -:15 or the-value of allowing the mi.ssi le 
buildup to continue. ----
9. A's payoff for 2.1 is +3 or the value of being allowed to continue 
the missil~ buildup +2~ minus +i for B's supporting U .N. action, 
plus +2 for supporting U.N. action or +3. B's payoff for 2.1, is 
-14 o~ the value of allowing missile buildup to continue - Llp lus 
+1 for supporting U.N. action or -14. ~-
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10. A's payoff for 2.1, is +3 or the same as last value as last move; 
B's payoff for 2.2, is :f4 or the same value as last move. 
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11. A's payoff for 2.1, is .:.2. or the value of being forced to remove 
missiles -11 plus +2 for supporting U.N. action or .:.2,; B's payoff 
for 2.3 is +11 or the value of forcing Soviet missiles out of Cuba 
by indirect military action. 
12. A's payoff for 2.1, is .:.2. or the same value as last move; B's 
payoff for 2.4, is +15 or the value of successfully intervening in 
Cuba to remove missiles with prior warning. 
13. A's payoff for 2.1, is .:.2. or the same value as last move;~ 
payoff for 2.5, is +14 or the same value as last move minus +1 for 
not giving prior warning. 
14. A's payoff for 2.1, is -23 or the value of allowing itself to be 
destroyed by nuclear strike, plus +2 for supporting U.N. action to 
resolve missile crisis;~ payoff for 2.6, is +25 or the value of 
successful nuclear strike against the Soviet Union without response. 
15. A's. payoff for 2.2, is +3 or the value of being allowed to continue 
missile buildup +2, plus +1 for supporting U.N. action coupled with 
threats or +3; B's payoff for l, is -15 or the value of allowing 
missile buildup to continue. 
16. A's payoff for 2.2, is +3 or the same value as last move; B's 
payoff for 2.1, is -14 or the value of allowing missile buildup 
to continue -15 plus +1 for supporting U.N. action. 
17. A's payoff for 2.2, is -7.4. This is obtained by (a) subtracting 
the U.N. bonus point +1 from the value of American intervention 
-11, and multiplying the result by its probability ..J!; (b) assign-
ing the residual probability..!..£ to the value of the resulting 
situation if the Americans did not intervene +3 and multiplying 
these values; and (c) summing up results of step a and step b 
equals -7.4; B's payoff for 2.2, is .:l· This is obtained (a) 
multip_lying the result of Soviet intervention -25 by its probabil-
ity~; (b) assigning the residual probability..!...£ to the value_of 
the resulting situation if the Soviets did not intervene +15 and 
multiplying these values; and (c) summing up results of step a and 
b equals .:l· 
18. ~ payoff for 2.2, is -10. Player A's payoff involves no proba-
bility calculation for}:, knows what! has done, namely,! has 
announced and executed limited military action or intervention. 
Thus, the value to}:, is -11, the utility of being forced to remove 
the missiles from Cuba less +1 for supporting U.N. action. B's 
payoff for 2.3, is +1. Player B's payoff involves a calculation, 
for A's strategy involves a threat subsequent to any threatened 
intervention by!· We have assigned a probability of~ to a 
threat by }:, subsequent to intervention by !· Thus, B's payoff 
equals +11 or the value of successful limited military action or 
intervention, less the value of a subsequent Soviet-American 
military confrontation -25 times its probability ,4 or -10. The 
payoff for~' therefore-;-I"s ±!l plus -10 or +l. ~ 
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19. !..'....! payoff for 2.2, is .:!Q. Player A's payoff is calculated the 
same way as the last move. B's payoff for 2.5, is Q. B's payoff 
is calculated the same as the last move except that the probability 
of Soviet intervention is increased to .6, times the value of a 
subsequent American-Soviet confrontatio~-25 equals -15. Adding 
the value of a successful Soviet intervention +15 pl~the value of 
possible confrontation =O. ~-
20. A's payoff for 2.2, is -10. Player A's payoff is calculated the 
same as the last move. B's payoff for 2.5, is ..:l· B's payoff is 
calculated the same as the last move ex~t +l is deducted from the 
value of successful intervention because no prior warning was 
given. 
21. A's payoff for 2.2, is -24, or the value of allowing itself to be 
destroyed by nuclear strike, plus +l for supporting U.N. action 
coupled with threats. B's payoff for 2 .6., is +25 or the value of 
a successful nuclear strike against the Soviet Union without 
response. 
22. A's payoff for 2 .3, is +11 or the value of successfully executing 
T'i_;ited militaryaction7r intervention that causes U.S. to back 
down, allowing the missile buildup to continue. B's payoff for l, 
is .::.11 or the value of allowing the missile buildup to continue. 
23. A's payoff for 2.3, is +10 or the same as the last move less +l for 
threats. B's payoff for 2.1, is -14 or the same value as the last 
value plus +l for supporting U.N.~tion. 
24. A's payoff for 2.3, is -9 or the probability calculation of mili-
tary confrontation between the U.S.S.R. and U.S. or.:.§. times -25 = 
-20. Added to the value of proposed limited military action +11 = 
-9. B's payoff for 2.2, is -10_. B's payoff requires no probabil-
ity calculation for,!! has already executed limited military action 
or intervention or .:.11 plus +l. for supporting U.N. action= -10. 
25. A's payoff for 2.3, is -9 or the same as the last move.-~ payoff 
for 2.3, is +l. B's payoff is obtained by multiplying the threat 
of u:S:- - u.S:-s.R. military confrontation or~ times -25 or -10 
plus the value of limited military intervention +11 = +l. 
26. A's payoff for 2.3, is -9 or the same as the last move. B's payoff 
for 2.4, is Q or the value of successful intervention +15 plus the 
probability of confrontation..:..§. times -25 = -15 added to +15 = O. 
27. A's payoff for 2.3, is -9 or the same as last move. B's payoff for 
2.5, is -1 or the same as last move less +l for not giving prior 
warning. 
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28. A's payoff for 2.3, is -25 or the value of a military confrontation 
~h the Soviet~ver the Cuban crisis. B's payoff for 2.6, is -25 
or the same as A's. 
29. A's vayoff for 2.4, is +15 or the value of a successful military 
intervention in Cuba to protect the missile sites. B's payoff for 
1, is -25 or the value of allowing the missile buildup to continue 
aided by Soviet reinforcements. 
30. A's payoff for 2.4, is +15 or the same as the last move. B's pay-
off for 2.1, is -24 or the same as the last move plus +l for sup-
porting U.N. action. 
31. ~ payoff for 2.4, is -7.5 or the value of military intervention 
+15 plus the risk of military confrontation~ times its value 
-25 = -22.5 plus +15 = -7.5. B's payoff for 2.2, is -24 or the 
same as the last move. 
32. A's payoff for 2.4, is -7.5 or the same as the last move. B's 
payoff for 2.3, is -4, equals the value of military confrontation 
-25 times its probability ~ or -15 plus +11 for limited interven-
tion= -4. 
' 33. A's payoff for 2.4, 'is -25 or the value of a military confrontation 
over the Cuban missile crisis. B's payoff for 2.4, is -25 or the 
same as A's. 
34. A's payoff for 2.4, is -25 or the same value as last move. B's 
payoff for 2.5, is -25 or the same as last move. 
35. A's payoff for 2.4, is -25 or the same value as the last move. B's 
payoff for 2.6, is -25 ~the same as the last move. 
36. A's payoff for 2.5, is +14 or the value of successful intervention 
~Cuba without prior w~ing. B's payoff for l, is -25 or the 
value of allowing the missile build-up to continue bolstered by 
Soviet reinforcements. 
37. A's payoff for 2.5, is +14 or the same as the last move. B's 
payoff for£.:..!., is -24 ~the same as the last move plus +l for 
supporting U.N. action. 
38. A's payoff for 2.5, is -8.5 or the value of successful intervention 
with no prior threat +14 less the probability~ of a military 
confrontation times its value -25 = -22.5 plus +14 = -8.5. B's 
payoff for 2.2, is -24 or the same as the last move. 
39. A's payoff for 2.5, is -8.5 or the same as the last move. B's 
payoff for 2.3, is -4 or the value of limited military intervention 
+11 plus the probability of confrontation~ times its value 
-25 = -15 plus +11 = -4. 
40, A's payoff for 2.5, is -25 or the value of confrontation. B's 
payoff for 2.4, is -25 or the same as A's. 
41. A's payoff for 2.5, is -25 or the same as last move. B's payoff 
for 2.4, is -25 or the same as A's. 
42. A's payoff for 2.5, is -25 or the same as last move. B's payoff 
~ 2.6, is -25 or the ~e as A's. 
43. A's payoff for 2.6, is +25 or the value of successful nuclear 
strike with no response-.--B's payoff for 1, is .-25 or the value 
of not reacting to nuclear strike. 
44. A's payoff for 2.6, is +25 or the same as last move. B's payoff 
for 2.1, is -24 or the same as last move plus +l for supporting 
U.N. action. 
45. A's payoff for 2.6, is +25 or the same as last move. B's payoff 
for 2.2, is -24 or the same as last move. 
46. A's payoff for 2.6, is -25 or the value of a nuclear war with B. 
B's payoff for 2.3, is -25 or the same as A's. 
'47. A's payoff for 2.6, is -25 or the same as the last move. B's 
payoff for 2.4, is -25 or the same as A's. 
48. A1 s payoff for 2.6, is -25 or the same as the last move. B's 
payoff for 2.5, is -25 or the same as A's. 
49. A's payoff for 2.6, is -25 or the same as the last move. B's 
payoff for U,, is -25 or the same as A's. 
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50. A's payoff for 3.1 or 2.5, is +14 or the value of successful inter-
~tion less +l for no-;;rning-.--B's payoff for 1, is -25 or the 
value of allowing the missile buildup to continue bolstered by 
Soviet reinforcements. 
51. A's payoff for 3.2 or 2.1, is +3 or the value of being allowed to 
continue the missile b~d-up plus +l for supporting U.N. action 
less +l for U.S. supporting U.N. action. B's payoff for 2.1, is 
-14 or the value of allowing the build-up to continue plus +l for 
supporting the U.N. 
52. A's payoff for 3.3 or 2.2, is -8 or the value of possible U.S. 
intervention..:.§. times its valu-;--11 less the U.N. bonus point=..:§_. 
B's payoff for 2.2 is -12.5 or the value if Soviets did not inter-
vene -25 times its probability .5 = -12.5. 
53. ~ payoff for 3.4 or 2.2, is -10 or the value of being forced to 
remove missiles plus +l for supporting U.N. action. ~ payoff for 
2.2, is +l or the probability calculation of the value of Soviet 
intervention -25 times its probability .4 = -10 plus the value of 
limited intervention +11 = +l. 
54. A's payoff for 3.5 or 2.2, is -10 or the same value as the last 
move. B's payoff for 2.4, is O or the value of successful inter-
vention +15 plus the value of Soviet-American confrontation -25 
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times its probability .6 = -15 plus +15 = O. 
55. A's payoff for 3.6 or 2.2, is -10 or the same as the last move. 
B's payoff for 2.5, is -1 or the same as the last move less +l for 
not giving prior warning. 
56. A's payoff for 3.7 or 2.2, is -10 or the same as the last move. 
B's payoff for either 2.4 or 2.5, is -.5 or the same as last move 
dividing the difference between 2.4 and 2.5 or +l, for -.5. 
57. A's payoff for 3.8 or 2.6, is -25 or the value of nuclear confron-
tation. B's payoff for 2.6, is -25 or the same as A's. 
58. B's payoff for 3.1 or 2.5, is +15 or the value of a successful 
int~rvention in Cuba. A's payoff for l, is -11 or the value of 
losing missile sites in Cuba to American intervention. 
59. B's payoff for 3.2 or 2.3, is +10 or the value of limited military 
action or intervention less +l for U.N. bonus point. A's payoff 
for 2.1, is -9 or the value of being forced to remove missiles 
plus +2 for supporting U.N. action. 
60. B's payoff for 3.3 or 2.3, is +l or the value of limited interven-
tion plus the value of probable confrontation~ times -25 = -10 
plus +11 = +l. A's payoff for 2.2, is -10 or the value of being 
forced by limited intervention to remove missiles -11 plus +l for 
supporting U.N. action coupled with threats. 
61. B's payoff for 3.4 or 2.3, is +l or the value of successful limited 
intervention +11 plus the possibility of confrontation ~ ti.mes its 
value -25 equals -10 plus +11 = +l. A's payoff for 2.3, is -11.5 
or the value of limited intervention +11 plus the value of confron-
tation -25 times its probability .9 =~2.5 plus +11 = -11.5. 
62. B's payoff for 3.5 or 2.3, is +l or the same as last move. A's 
payoff for 2.4, is -7.5 or the value of successful intervention 
+15 plus the probability of confrontation -25 times its probability 
.9 = -22.5 plus +15 = -7.5. 
63. B's payoff for 3.6 or 2.3, is +l or the same as the last move. A's 
payoff for 2.5, is -8.5 or the same as last move less +l for not 
giving warning. 
64. B's payoff for 3.7 or 2.5, is -25 or the value of a confrontation. -A's payoff for either 2.4 or 2.5, is -25 or the same as B's. 
65. B's payoff for 3.8 or 2.6, is -25 or the value of a nuclear war. 
A's payoff for 2.6, is -25 or the same as A's. 
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